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 For as long as people have held opinions in the political realm, there has been research 
trying to decipher exactly what people think and believe as well as when they begin to hold these 
beliefs. This present study sorts the respondents studied into age cohorts and then follows them 
throughout the data. All of the data used in this study are from the National Election Study Data 
from 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. This study is a repeated cross-sectional study 
since different individuals are used throughout the study, and this study measures opinions only 
on the aggregate level. Sorting the respondents into age cohorts allows this study to track people 
of similar age as they respond to different life experiences as well as world events as they age. 
When appropriate, the data are compared to the main models of political socialization to 
determine how accurate these generally accepted models are. 
 The items analyzed in this study vary greatly in subject as well as how specific they are. 
Everything from United States Presidential vote choices, opinions on affirmative action and 
federal welfare spending to political knowledge is analyzed to ascertain if these things interact 
with age, and if they do interact with age, to what extent. Besides observing opinions on these 
issues, certain issues will have their saliency measured throughout the years using the Somers’ D 
statistic. This will help determine what issues people are thinking of when they are forming their 
ideology. The results from this paper show that some issues and beliefs, such as self-described 
ideology and political knowledge, are very strongly related to age. Other issues and beliefs in the 
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political realm, such as strength of United States Presidential vote choice and opinions on federal 
welfare spending, seem to not be related to age or influenced heavily by period effects and other 
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Perhaps no inquiry has been further investigated in political science than that of political 
socialization. That is, why do people hold the political opinions they have, and when are these 
opinions acquired? In other words, how are people socialized in the political realm (Clawson and 
Oxley 29)? And once these opinions are formed, are these opinions uncompromising and acute, 
or are political feelings and opinions elastic and adjustable? It would seem that it is impossible 
for every person who is politically socialized to keep every opinion exactly the same throughout 
their entire lives. So then, for the changes that are observed, what are the magnitude and 
direction of these changes? Are they random in nature, or does what is happening in the world 
matter? Asked another way, do events matter? Having these questions answered would help 
explain the ways in which and when people act in political realms.  
 It is also important to establish a protocol that defines exactly what change is and the 
different types of change. The first kind of change is called cohort succession (Glenn, Cohort 
Analysis 35). Cohort succession occurs when there is a change in aggregate opinion due to an 
addition in the population because of birth and aging, or subtraction of individuals due to death. 
The second kind of change is called intracohort change and it is caused by changes in the 
characteristics of a population that do not include aging (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 35). 
 One of the main models that attempts to explain the political socialization process is 
called the impressionable years model. This model says that attitudes are formed during late 
adolescence and into early adulthood (usually considered to be the ages 17 to 26), and then 
remain very stable throughout the life span (Erikson and Tedin 132). Put another way, this model 
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says opinions for the young are somewhat erratic, and by the time people enter into their middle 
ages, these opinions will be much more stable. According to this model, much more change will 
occur between the ages 17-26 than will occur between 26- 35, for example. This theory is 
supported by many prominent political socialization studies, perhaps none more known then the 
panel study described by Jennings and Niemi in Generations And Politics: A Panel Study of 
Young Adults and Their Parents. For example, partisanship in 1965 and 1973 had a correlation 
of .5, when the respondents were 18 and 26. Between the ages of 26-35, this correlation rises to 
.65 and stays at .65 for the ages of 35 and 50 (Erikson and Tedin 138-139). To put it simply, the 
data show that after attitudes are formed in the impressionable years they crystallize in late life. 
But, party identification is widely considered the most stable political orientation, and so these 
data are not necessarily indicative for any other type of political attitude or characteristic.  
 A competing model of the impressionable years model is the life-long openness model 
(Jennings and Niemi 20). This model basically says that minimal learning at most occurs during 
the impressionable years. In addition, this model not only says that individuals can change, but 
that they do change in different types of characteristics. Essentially, this model is the opposite of 
the impressionable years model. In the middle of the impressionable years model and the life-
long openness model is the life-cycle model (Jennings and Niemi 20-21). This model says that 
while persistence should be expected, there are certain characteristics that can change, and 
indeed, probably will change as people age. For example, the life-cycle model can be applied to 
the tendency of young adults to be liberal, and then more conservative later. Another model 
between impressionable years and life-long openness is the generational model (Jennings and 
Niemi 21). This model says that persistence is the rule and changes will not necessarily occur. 
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Rather, changes should only be expected in response to powerful social and political movements. 
In the analysis, the impressionable years model will be the main theory that the data are 
compared to, and the life-long openness model, the life-cycle model and the generational model 
will act as alternative theories when the impressionable years model does not fit the data.  
 The analysis will be an aggregate analysis on collective public opinion since mass 
opinions and changes will be observed, rather than how individual opinions change over time. It 
is important to point out that while there could be a lot of change on the individual level, none of 
this would be apparent in the aggregate analysis. All questions will be answered by using the 
National Election Study Data. The United States Presidential Elections of 1984, 1988, 1992, 
1996, 2000, and 2004 will be the elections that are analyzed in attempting to answer the 
questions in this study. Since data will be used from different individuals from different times, 
this analysis is called a repeated cross-sectional (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 5). As such, no 
individual is studied at more than one time and panel-conditioning effects here are of no concern. 
The protocol that will be used is similar to that used by Paul R. Abramson in Political Attitudes 
in America: Formation and Change (Abramson 53). This means that when age cohorts are 
formed, the cut off point for each cohort will be seven years where the data allows.  
 Inquires covered in this study will vary in how specific they are. The first thing that will 
be explored is a simple look at the presidential elections broken down into how each age cohort 
voted, from 1984- 2004, in order to recognize any age, period, and cohort effects in voting 
patterns. For example, voters who had their impressionable years during the Reagan 
Administration might be expected to consistently vote more conservatively compared to others, 
and so this would be a cohort effect. Strength of preference for those who voted will also be 
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analyzed, and if the impressionable years model is correct, the older people get the stronger their 
preferences will be. After the Presidential elections from 1984 through 2004 are analyzed, Party 
ID will also be looked at to ascertain any period, age and cohort effects. In addition, it will be 
useful to see if the party system is being rejected by the young which will be the case if the 
number of independents is going up. Although if more independents are found among the young, 
it may be generational effects as opposed to cohort effects since it is possible the young have just 
not found where they “fit” in the political party system yet. To help in figuring out if the young 
are rejecting the party system, strength of partisanship will be examined also, again with the 
expectation that partisanship strengthens as people get older if the impressionable years model is 
correct. Next, opinions on abortion rights will be examined to see if the cohorts themselves 
change their opinions on the issue through time, as well as to observe any differences among the 
cohorts. Then, political knowledge and voter turnout will be analyzed, as well as the interest 
people have in public affairs. Presumably, an 18 year old who might still live with their parents 
would show a different level of interest compared to the middle aged who have a vested interest 
in how much their salary is taxed. For political knowledge, respondents were asked to answer 
basic questions that are typical for studies like this one. This measure is useful to see how many 
people are misguided with their political views. To be sure age is the only factor in the analysis, 
education will be controlled for when analyzing levels of political knowledge and interest in 
public affairs, since it would not be a surprise education rather than age is what decides how 
closely someone follows politics or how much somebody knows. Opinions on homosexuals 
serving in the military will also be inspected also. 
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 Opinions on affirmative action will then be observed, and the findings should yield 
interesting results since it is a hot button issue and has been challenged in the Supreme Court 
several times in the past decade. Opinions on what respondents think the most important national 
problem is and their opinion on the standing of the United States provides an opportunity to test 
whether the young are more affected by events compared with the middle aged and elderly, since 
according to the impressionable years model this is the case. This can be done by observing 
opinions on the standing of the U.S. before and after 9/11, and then by comparing the changes in 
opinions (if there are any) that the young had with those that the older had. If those in their 
impressionable years had a larger change in opinion compared to those who are older, it would 
seem that the young are more influenced by events and what is going on in the world, while the 
middle aged have their opinions so crystallized there is little room for change even in the face of 
a major event. If the data does not show this, the impressionable years model would be incorrect 
in at least some instances. Further, if an opinion changes drastically it could just illustrate how 
some issues are salient while others are not. This could potentially help explain why Party ID is 
traditionally stable; it is important to people, so they pay attention to it. It is also important to 
point out the argument against saliency and opinion stability, and that is if large fluctuations are 
seen it may be because these opinions are actually nonattitudes (Erikson and Tedin 32). This 
means that if large changes are seen in opinions without any major events that could have caused 
these changes in opinion, then the opinions are useless. So, if an opinion changes dramatically 
for no clear reason, a possible explanation could be that people do not hold meaningful opinions.  
 While the above questions focus on what people think, the next inquiries will focus on 
how different age cohorts get their political information. If there are clear differences in opinion 
 
6 
among the age cohorts, perhaps different sources of political information could help account for 
some differences in opinions about the issues. Determining how people get their news will be 
done by comparing how often the different age cohorts read newspapers. The same will be done 
for news programs on television as well the Internet. With the relatively young age of mass 
access to the Internet, how the different age cohorts respond should be revealing about exactly 
who is utilizing the new technology and who relies on what other methods to get political 
information. 
 The problems of a cohort analysis like this are well documented. The complication in 
analyzing age, period, and cohort simultaneously is known as the identification problem (Glenn, 
Cohort Analysis 6).  This problem ensues because there are three independent variables and they 
are all linear functions of each other. This makes it statistically impossible to separate age, 
period, and cohort. Essentially this means that when a change is observed over a certain period of 
time, there is no technique to interpret if the change is due to age effects, period effects, or cohort 
effects. In many instances, age effects, cohort effects, and period effects are all at work when 
change is observed. However, lack of precise explanations does not mean that acceptable and 
correct explanations cannot be deduced. During a cohort analysis, then, it is the job of the 
researcher to make correct inferences. This is done by taking side information and using it to aid 
in figuring out which effect(s) causes change (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 7). Further, in many 
instances simply using common sense can make reasonable judgments Glenn, Cohort Analysis 
22). Also, different theories as well as knowledge of the times can help in reaching reasonable 
judgments. In short, separating age effects, period effects, and cohort effects is statistically 
impossible. While being cautious to not make faulty judgments, it is the job of the researcher to 
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figure out the logic puzzle of sorts that the combination of age effects, period effects, and cohort 
effects presents in a cohort analysis like this one.  
     In conclusion, the impressionable years model will be tested in this analysis while the life-
long opens model, the generational model and the life-cycle model will act as alternatives when 
the impressionable years model does not fit. The nature of the analysis will be an aggregate 
repeated cross sectional. The analysis will start off by observing voting trends in the Presidential 
Elections from 1984-2004 broken down by age cohort. Next, Party ID will be observed. In 
addition, opinions on abortion will also be observed for any changes in opinion throughout time 
as the cohorts age. Voter turnout and political knowledge will also be analyzed. In many cases, 
education will be controlled for as to not confuse educational effects with age effects. Opinions 
on the standing of the United States will also be analyzed before and after 9/11 to see if events 
really do matter in changing opinions, with particular attention paid to the difference in the 
change of opinions among adults and the change of opinions among those in their impressionable 
years; the same will be done when analyzing the most important national problem during the end 
of the Cold War. This will gauge if the young are more responsive to the political environment. 
Affirmative action will also be inspected. Where age cohorts get their news will also be 
ascertained, as different sources of news could explain some differences in opinion among the 
cohorts. The problems of an analysis like this are well documented, and the researcher will take a 





PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE AND PARTISANSHIP 
Presidential Vote Choice 
 
How Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 voted throughout the 1984-2004 years provides some 
interesting observations. Cohort 1 voted 56.3% Republican during Reagan’s reelection in 1984 
and 50.6% Republican for Bush in 1988, while cohort 2 voted 51.8% for Bush. Then, when Bush 
ran for reelection in 1992 the Cohort 1 Republican vote dropped 10.5% to 40.1% while the 
Cohort 2 Republican vote dropped 21.7% to 30.1%. Both cohorts had their impressionable years 
during Republican administrations and should be expected to stay loyal to Republicans according 
to the impressionable years model, but as Erikson and Tedin point out, “Bush started his 
administration riding high from the end of the cold war, and then the successful Gulf War. Only 
as his term ended did Bush’s approval approximate the low numbers predicted by hard economic 
times” (Erikson and Tedin 109). It seems Bush lost votes because his foreign policy skills were 
no longer valued as highly since the Cold War was coming to a close. It is also important to note 
that Erikson and Tedin say, “It is common knowledge that the president’s approval rating rises 
and falls with the state of the economy” (Erikson and Tedin 107). Put another way, Bush was in 
trouble when the economic hard times started. This is confirmed when analyzing what people 
thought the number one national problem was. In 1984, 31.2% of Cohort 1 thought economics 
was the biggest national problem while 39% thought foreign affairs was the most important 
national problem. In 1988, economics jumped to 40.1% for cohort 1 while foreign affairs 
dropped to 14.5%, and in 1992 economics went all the way up to 46.7% and foreign affairs 
plummeted all the way down to 3.3%. For Cohort 2, economics went from 33.2% in 1988 to 
41.4% in 1992, while foreign policy dramatically fell from 11.9% to 1.7% during the same 
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period. These statistics point to period effects since they crossed all the cohorts; the public felt 
that the foreign policy skills of Bush were not needed as much, and Bush took all the blame for 
the declining economy. This is supported by Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde who say, “The very 
low levels of expressed concern about international problems undoubtedly reflects the ending of 
the cold war…” (173).  
Further evidence of how strong this period effect was is the 38.7% of Cohort 3 who said 
the economy was the most important national issue in 1992. As the youngest cohort, they would 
presumably have the least amount of interest in the economy since they are not as established in 
the work force as the older cohorts. Indeed, the 38.7% is telling because out of the youngest 
cohorts in every year from 1984-2004, this is the highest percent that said the economy was the 
most important national issue. So, the data and outside information show that strong period 
effects were at work in the 1992 election. When the impressionable years model is applied, the 
validity of it depends on how one interprets the data. On the one hand, Cohort 1 voted 56.3% in 
1984 and 50.6% in 1988 before dropping to only 40.1% in 1992 when Clinton rose to the 
Presidency, roughly 16% less than in 1984. However, in both 1992 and 1996, Cohort 1, who had 
their impressionable years during the Reagan Administration, voted at least 10% more 
Republican than Cohort 2 and Cohort 3. Since Cohort 1 is older than Cohort 2 and Cohort 3, the 
more crystallized views of Cohort 1 are expected according to the impressionable years model. 
The data therefore most strongly support the impressionable years model since those who had 
their impressionable years during the Reagan Administration were more reliably Republican than 
anybody else.   
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Explaining the other cohorts is not as simple as the explanation for Cohort 1. For 
example, Cohort 2 voted 51.8% Republican in 1988, but then voted only 30.1% and 35.5% 
Republican in 1992 and 1996, respectively. One important factor in both of these races was the 
entry of Ross Perot who was not a factor in the election of 1988. As Abramson, Aldrich, and 
Rohde say, “There is considerable evidence that the Perot vote would have split evenly between 
Clinton and Bush in 1992. Of course, some Perot voters would not have voted at all if he had not 
been on the ballot…” (77). If we split the percent vote for Perot evenly between Bush and 
Clinton, Cohort 2 would have voted 54.9% for the Democrat candidate and 45.1% for the 
Republican candidate. These numbers are more comparable to those for Cohort 1. When Perot is 
out of the picture in the 2000 election, Cohort 2 votes 50% for the Republican candidate. It is not 
surprising that Cohort 2 voted more for Perot than Cohort 1; Cohort 2 was younger and their 
opinions were more elastic, whereas Cohort 1 was older and had more time for their opinions to 
solidify. The impact Perot had on the way the cohorts voted is best described as both an age 
effect and a period effect. The data show that every age cohort voted substantially more for 
independent candidates when Perot was running than when he was not, and this shows the period 
effect. The fact that the young were more influenced by Perot in the race shows how the voting 
results also show evidence of an age effect. In short, the elections in the 1984-2000 years support 
a loose version of the impressionable years model. That is, the cohorts examined voted the way 
they were “supposed” to vote when there were no special circumstances, but caution is needed as 
to not under estimate extreme, unusual effects as the entrance of Perot in the elections of 1992 
and 1996 illustrated in the data. The generational model may seem more appropriate at first, but 





candidates was temporary. Therefore, out of the models used to describe political behavior, a 
loose version of the impressionable years model is the best fit for what the data are describing.  
Strength of Presidential Vote Choice 
 
When the strength of preference is examined for those who voted for President no clear 
patterns emerge. Observing Cohort 1 gives a good example of the lack of patterns. When 
answering this question, respondents answered either “strong” or “not strong”. In 1984, Cohort 1 
answered 80.2% strong, 71.9% strong in 1988, 78.7% strong in 1992, 69.4% strong in 1996 and 
66.4% strong in 2000. In 1988, Cohort 2 answered strong 74.5% of the time in 1988, 81.4% in 
1992, 65.6% in 1996, 75.5% in 2000 and 85.5% in 2004. Cohort 3 goes from 82.2% strong in 
1992, to 71.4% in 1996 and 81.3% in 2000. Cohort 4, the youngest Cohort in 1996, had 81.2% 
who voted strongly. This data certainly does not fit the impressionable years model since the 
youngest cohort often is voting with a stronger preference than the older cohorts. 
As we have seen, the percent of people from each cohort feeling a strong preference for 
the candidate they voted for follows no specific pattern.  For example, in 1996 Cohort 4 was the 
youngest cohort and voted strongly 81.2% of the time, but Cohort 1 voted strongly only 69.4% 
of the time. The impressionable years model would tell us that Cohort 1 would have voted 
stronger since their views would have been more crystallized. Additionally, Cohort 1 only 
increased their strength of preference for the Presidential vote once, and it was by a little over 
7% after they had dropped more than that in a previous Presidential election. Rather than 
disproving the impressionable years model, this data is more illustrative of the strength and 
importance of short-term factors. Flanigan and Zingale hold that there are certain short-term 
forces so strong, such as the personal attributes of candidates, they can make or break a candidate 
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(Flanigan and Zingale 171). While strength of preference is determined in large part by short-
term forces that do not reveal much about long-term political socialization, the percent of strong 




Strong partisans is a strong and reliable measure to see how the cohorts are (or are not) 
becoming more partisan throughout the years because there is no doubt as to what a strong 
partisan is, as opposed to trying to figure out what the differences between a “leaning 
independent” and a “independent” are. With this is mind, strong partisans certainly follow the 
pattern the impressionable years model say it would both within each cohort as well as among 
the cohorts.  
Each cohort in this study shows an upward trend in the percent of people who classify 
themselves as a strong partisan, although of course the patterns are not perfect and there are 
several exceptions. But generally the data fit the impressionable years model and this should be 
expected as Campbell et al. showed in the American Voter (161). Although the data in their 
study is from the 1950’s, the similarities between what they found in their data and the findings 
in this study reveal just how strong partisanship is as well as how long it has been potent as the 
data in this study are from the 1980’s, 1990’s and early 2000’s.  
Cohort 1 was 17.1% “Strong Partisan” in 1984 to 27% in 1988, 21.4% in 1992, 30% in 
1996 and 30.9% in 2000. Clearly there is an upward trend, although it is imperfect. Cohort 2 
follows a similar pattern as Cohort 1. In 1988 Cohort 2 was 21.2% “Strong Partisan”, 19.5% in 
1992, 26.3% in 1996, 31% in 2000 and 31.5% in 2004. Again, a clear upward trend is seen and 
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continues among the other cohorts. Cohort 3 was 15.9% “Strong Partisan” in 1992, 25.4% in 
1996 and 24.6% in 2000. Cohort 4 was 20.8% “Strong Partisan” in 1996, 24.8% in 2000 and 
24.3% in 2004. Cohort 4 does not fit the impressionable years model as well as Cohort 1, Cohort 
2 and Cohort 3 do, but with only three years of data it would be premature to call it an anomaly. 
Cohort 5 is 16.5% “Strong Partisan” in 2000 and 34.9% in 2004. To be sure, the general upward 
trend each cohort has fits the impressionable years model very well as the older people are, the 
stronger their partisanship is. As Campbell et al. put it in The American Voter, “Older people 
have had more time to accumulate tenure in their party association, even those who in their 
earlier years moved from one party to the other” (65). Indeed, this is supported when the cohorts 
are compared with one another throughout the years. For example, in 1992 Cohort 1 was 21.4% 
“Strong Partisan” while Cohort 2 was 19.5% “Strong Partisan” and Cohort 3 was 15.9%. Indeed, 
the older feel more established to their parties than the young do. This pattern is seen again in 
1996 as Cohort 1 was 30% “Strong Partisan”, Cohort 2 had 26.3% in the same category while 
Cohort 3 and 4 had 25.4% and 20.8%, respectively. The pattern continues in 2000 where Cohort 
1 had 30.9% “Strong Partisan”, Cohort 2, Cohort 3, Cohort 4 and Cohort 5 had 31%, 24.6%, 
24.8% and 16.5% labeled as “Strong Partisan”, respectively. So as we have seen, the data in this 
study most certainly support the impressionable years model as far as Party ID is concerned 




In addition to the patterns observed in the data on Strength of Partisanship, a clear pattern 
emerges on the data on partisanship in which as the cohorts aged they tended to identify more 
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with a conservative ideology than with a moderate or liberal ideology. For example, take Cohort 
1. In 1984 Cohort 1 was 36.6% Conservative, 50% in 1988, 52.8% in 1992, 54.2% in 1996, and 
67.8% in 2000. Although Cohort 1 is showing age effects consistent with all cohorts it is 
important to keep in mind the impressionable years for this cohort were during the Reagan 
Administration, and thus age effects are intermingled with cohort effects. As we will see, the 
data on the other cohorts eliminates the possibility of having solely a cohort effect responsible 
for Cohort 1 becoming more conservative as it ages, since all the cohorts become more 
conservative as they age.  
Cohort 2 was 43% Conservative in 1988, 49.4% in 1992, 49.4% in 1996, 64.7% in 2000 
and 62.7% in 2004. Cohort 3, which was 43.9% Conservative in 1992, was 56.9% Conservative 
in 2000. Cohort 4 was 42.2% Conservative in 1996 and 55.8% Conservative in 2004, and Cohort 
5 went from 30% Conservative in 2000 to 41.9% in 2004. Clearly there is a pattern of more 
conservatism as the cohorts age and this can be due to many reasons. Campbell et al. say that 
while it is impossible to say why people become more conservative as they age perhaps the fact 
that, “…in general the Republican Party has an air of respectability, conservatism, and social 
status which the Democratic Party does not fully share. If we assume that these values have an 
increasing appeal to older people we have the essential conditions for the creation of an age 
dimension in political partisanship” (165-166). It is important to point out that not everybody 
agrees on what the data are actually showing. Glenn says that, “Paradoxically, people may 
become more likely to consider themselves conservative and to be considered conservative by 
others while, according to a constant definition of conservatism, they become less conservative” 
(Glenn, Aging and Conservatism 185). In other words Glenn thinks that people may think they 
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are becoming more conservative, but they really are not. Indeed, Glenn makes a strong statement 
when he says, “Although the evidence suggests that attitudes probably become somewhat less 
susceptible to change as people grow older, there is scant evidence for any other contribution of 
aging to conservatism” (Glenn, Aging and Conservatism 176). Glenn also adds that, “Whereas 
aging cohorts have changed in the same direction as the total adult population, those aging 
beyond young adulthood have generally changed less than the total population. Perhaps this 
increase in the relative conservatism of aging persons explains why one study shows an increase 
in conservative self identifications in aging cohorts, but not in the total population” (Glenn, 
Aging and Conservatism 185). So then, it would seem without further information there is no 
consensus on what the data are showing, besides the fact that people at least think they are more 
conservative as they get older.  
In order to tell if people are really becoming more conservative specific issue positions 
need to be observed. In other words, do the cohorts, as they self-classify as more conservative, 
also have the “appropriate” opinions to match their conservative position? For example, does 
Cohort 1, who was 67.8% conservative in 2000, have a similar percent of people who hold 
conservative opinions on abortion in 2000? If not, does this mean that as people get older, 
ideology tends to correlate less with specific issue positions? Is ideology a better indicator of 
issue positions for the young? There is no doubt that the data shows a clear trend of people 
classifying themselves as more conservative as they get older, and a look at specific issue 
positions will help decipher if people really are getting more conservative or if ideology is really 
not indicative of issue positions.  
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OPINIONS ON ABORTION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND GAY 
RIGHTS 
Opinions on Abortion 
 
When opinions on when abortion should be allowed are observed for Cohort 1, the results 
are the opposite of what they “should” be for a cohort who is classifying themselves as 
increasingly conservative. In 1984, 37.9% of Cohort 1 said a woman should always be able to 
obtain an abortion (e.g. not only in extreme circumstances such as rape or incest). In 1988 this 
number goes up to 44.6% and in 1992 it rises again to 48.9%. In 1996 the percent of people in 
Cohort 1 who think a woman should always be allowed to get an abortion under the law is 
51.3%, and then it 2000 the percent stays stable at 51.5%. These are not the kind of issue 
positions on abortion a cohort “should” have if they are classifying themselves as more and more 
conservative as they age. When ideology is controlled for, and only people who classify 
themselves as conservatives are observed, 29.1% say abortion should always be allowed by law 
in 1984, 34.7% say abortion should always be allowed in 1988, the percent jumps to 38.1% in 
1992, dips to 33.7% in 1996, and rises again to 37.5% in 2000. This is an interesting find since it 
shows that even among conservatives, Cohort 1 generally favors legal abortion more as they age.  
Cohort 2 displays similar patterns to Cohort 1, although the upward trend is not as strong. 
In 1988, 38.6% of Cohort 2 thought that abortion should always be legal, in 1992 this percent 
jumped to 50.4%, in 1996 it dipped to 49%, declined to 47.9% in 2000 and again in 2004 at 44%. 
When only conservatives are looked at, 35% say abortion should always be legal in 1988, 45.2% 
say abortion should always be legal in 1992, the number dips to 40.8% in 1996, stays about the 
same at 41.5% in 2000 and then has a significant drop to 31.9% in 2004.  
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Cohort 3 stays about the same in the 3 years it is in the data, having 51% saying abortion 
should always be legal in 1992, 50.4% in 1996 and 48.6% in 2000. When ideology is controlled 
for and only conservatives are observed in 1992, 1996 and 2000 41.2%, 32.7% and 43.9% think 
abortion should always be legal in those years, respectively. Cohort 4, before ideology is 
controlled for, has 40.1% saying abortion should always be legal in 1996, 40.7% in 2000 and 
43.1% in 2004. When conservatives are the only people looked at these numbers in 1996, 2000 
and 2004 are 30.6%, 23.8% and 34.2%, respectively. Cohort 5 had 41% say abortion should 
always be legal in 2000 and 49.3% say the same in 2004, before the control of ideology. When 
ideology is controlled for in 2000 and 2004 these numbers for conservatives are 37% and 40%, 
respectively.  
 The data describing opinions on the legality of abortion and ideology allow for some 
conclusions on the predictive power ideology has for opinions on abortion. For Cohort 1 the data 
illustrate that ideology is a poor predictor for opinions on abortion. As stated earlier, Cohort 1 
went from 36% self-identifying as conservative in 1984 to 67.8% in 2000. During the same 
interval, from 1984 to 2000, Cohort 1 went from 37.9% thinking abortion should always be legal 
to 51.5% thinking abortion should always be legal. Cohort 2 shows a similar pattern of having 
increasing conservatism, going from 43% in 1988 to 62.7% in 2004, and yet they are also 
become more permissive on the legality of abortion as the percent who say abortion should 
always be legal in 1988 is 38.6% and then this number goes up to 44% in 2004. Clearly the data 
show that Cohort 2 is following the same pattern as Cohort 1; despite growing conservatism, 
Cohort 2 is more permissive of abortion.  
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 Cohort 3 was 43.9% conservative in 1992 and 56.9% in 2000, and during this same time 
Cohort 3 went from 51% thinking abortion should always be legal to 48.6% thinking abortion 
should always be legal. Although this data is more of a fit of what a cohort who is getting more 
conservative “should” think, there is also only 8 years of data here, whereas Cohort 1 and Cohort 
2 have 16 years of data. This certainly does not discredit the data on Cohort 3, but having half 
the amount of data as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 is something that needs to be kept in mind. 
 For abortion, then, it is safe to conclude that as people age, the weaker their ideology is as 
a predictor for the issue. In other words, for issue positions on abortion the younger the cohort is, 
the better predictor ideology will be. Does this mean the same is true for all issues as people age, 
that is, does ideology become a weaker predictor for issue positions the older people get, or is 
abortion a unique issue that does not line up with ideology? Perhaps social issues are not what 
make older people conservative, and maybe as people age they identify more with conservatism 
because of economic reasons. Only a further analysis of more issues will be able to answer this 
question. An interesting study, done by Mitchell Killian and Clyde Wilcox, may shed some light 
on the answer to this question. They said that while change of party can certainly occur for 
people who have strong opinions on abortion, they also found that, “…our results show that even 
the most pro-life democrats or pro-choice republicans are much more likely to remain with their 
current party than there are to defect to the opposing party” (Killian and Wilcox 571). Perhaps 
abortion is just not what people are thinking of when they define their ideology. With this in 
mind, looking at other issues besides abortion will be telling if abortion is unique in it not being 
able to be predicted by ideology as people age. 
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Opinions on Affirmative Action 
 
 No matter what the question is, the way people are asked things can have a large impact 
on the answers questions that are asked. Questions on affirmative action are a good example of 
this, as the way questions on affirmative action are asked cause great fluctuation in the answers 
given by respondents in surveys. As Clawson and Oxley put it, “As with other civil rights 
policies, whites and blacks support affirmative action in principle more than they do in practice” 
(Clawson and Oxley 260). People support the concept of helping out historically disadvantaged 
groups such as African Americans but, “Citizens’ support for affirmative action falls 
dramatically when the policies refer to specific steps to ensure the equal treatment of blacks” 
(Clawson and Oxley 260). This distinction in the way questions are posited means the manner 
the question was asked in the American National Election Study is important. The question 
asked by the cumulative data file used for this study is the following: “Some people say that 
because of past discrimination blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others 
say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks 
advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion-- are you for or against preferential 
hiring and promotion of blacks?” (American National Election Study 2004 Cumulative Data 
File). The way this question is worded obviously falls into to specific steps in helping African 
Americans, not a general principle. The framework of the question asked is important to keep in 
mind as the data on the cohorts in observed.  
 In 1992, 19.9% of Cohort 1 said they were “For” preferential hiring and promotion for 
blacks. In 1996, this number drops to 13.5% and in 2000 the number drops again to 11.8%. In 
the course of 8 years, the percent of people in Cohort 1 who support affirmative action for 
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African Americans was cut in half, roughly. In 1992 Cohort 2 answered 20.2% “For” preferential 
hiring and promotion for blacks. In 1996 this number dropped to 14.6%, in 2000 this number 
was 10.5% and in 2004 this number rose to 17.6%. Although Cohort 2 had a jump in the percent 
of people who supported affirmative action, the cohort still follows a general downward trend in 
the percent of people who support affirmative action. Cohort 3 went from 23.3% “For” 
affirmative action in 1992, and this number dropped in 1996 to 14.3% before dropping again to 
12.9% in 2000. Cohort 4 was 18.6% “For” affirmative action in 1996 and this number dipped to 
10% in 2000 before rising slightly to 14.5% in 2004. All the cohorts, as they age, have a general 
downward trend in their support for affirmative action. This means that as the cohorts are getting 
more conservative, their opinions on affirmative action match up with their growing 
conservatism.  
The data described above about opinions on affirmative action support the idea that 
ideology is a good predictor of the issue positions people have on affirmative action, in contrast 
to opinions on abortion. That is, as people become more conservative their opinions on 
affirmative action generally follow the conservative trend as well. Additionally, life cycle effects 
seem to be present in the data because as people age they tend to be against affirmative action. 
Perhaps once people are more established in the work force they do not want any advantage to be 
given to the people they are competing with. So far, then, we have seen that abortion and 
affirmative action have opposite relationships with ideology as far as predictive power goes; 
ideology is a very good predictor for both the old and the young for opinions on affirmative 
action, but ideology is only a good predictor for the young on abortion opinions. Something of 
relevance here are the ideas of Hetherington who says that, “Decreasing trust in government over 
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the last two generations has undermined public support for federal programs like welfare, food 
stamps, and foreign aid, not to mention the entire range of race-targeted programs to make 
equality between the races a reality” (Hetherington 139). Hetherington says that declining trust in 
the government causes people to support social welfare programs less. Hetherington also says 
that, “…it seems that declining political trust helps explain what many have erroneously referred 
to as a conservative turn in American politics” (Hetherington 61). So, perhaps people are not 
becoming more conservative about affirmative action because of age and maybe they appear 
more conservative because of distrust in government. However, for the purposes of this paper, 
the most important issue is that ideology is a good predictor of issue positions on affirmative 
action, even as people age. 
Opinions on Gay Rights 
 
Gay rights is another issue that can be observed to see if issues positions match up with 
the apparent growing conservatism in the cohorts as the cohorts age. If the cohorts really are 
becoming more conservative on issue positions then they should not favor homosexuals serving 
in the military. When Cohort 1 was asked in 1992 if they thought gays should be able to serve in 
the military, 61.2% supported having gays serve in the military. In 1996, this number went up to 
70.2% and in 2000 this number went up slightly to 73.7%. Cohort 1, who had more people every 
year classifying themselves as conservative, does not have their opinions on gay rights match up 
to their self-identifying conservatism.  
Cohort 2 had 59.9% say that they thought gays should be able to serve in the military in 
1992. This number goes up to 67.4% in 1996, 75.6% in 2000 and 79.7% in 2004. There is a clear 
trend here; Cohort 2 increasingly thinks that gays should be able to serve in the military. Cohort 
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3 shows a similar trend, as in 1992 Cohort 3 has 56.1% thinking that homosexuals should be 
allowed to serve in the military. In 1996 this number jumps to 79.2% and stays steady at 69.6% 
in 2000.  
In 1996, the first year Cohort 4 is in the data, Cohort 4 has 70.8% saying homosexuals 
should be able to serve in the military. In 2000 this number goes up to 73.5%, and the number 
goes up again to 86.7% in 2004. Cohort 5, who starts at 85.9% thinking homosexuals should be 
able to serve in the military in 2000, the first year it is in the data, drops slightly to 83.8% in 
2004. Clearly then all the cohorts become more accepting as they get older of homosexuals 
serving in the military.  
 The growing support for homosexuals to serve in the military is clear and substantial. 
While this support for homosexuals may not have been seen a few decades ago, Clawson and 
Oxley say that, “There has been a sea change in attitudes toward employment rights for gays and 
lesbians over the last three decades” and that, “Citizens demonstrate strong support for equal job 
opportunities for gays and lesbians” (Clawson and Oxley 274). In other words, there has been a 
period effect on all the cohorts that is pushing them towards supporting employment rights for 
the homosexual community. Brewer agrees and says that in the 1990’s, “One of the fundamental 
predispositions that shaped opinion in [gay rights], feelings towards gays and lesbians underwent 
shifts that produced greater support for gay rights policies” (Brewer 217). The data certainly 
support Brewer as well as Clawson and Oxley in that there has been strong, clear period effects 
influencing opinions about gay rights. These period effects were so strong and pronounced that 
they influenced all the cohorts roughly the same in the direction towards supporting homosexuals 
in the military. Most importantly, for this purpose of this paper, is the fact that the increasing 
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conservatism among all of the cohorts is not matched in conservative opinions about 
homosexuals in any sense. Indeed, it seems as though the cohort’s ideology contradicts with their 




SOMERS’ D FOR ABORTION, GAY RIGHTS, AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 
Somers’ D for Abortion 
 
When Somers’d is observed for the above issues, all of which are social issues, some 
clear patterns emerge. When Somers’ D was calculated the independent variable was whatever 
issue position was being observed while the dependent variable was the 3 category liberal-
conservative scale used earlier in this paper, while the cohort syntax described earlier in this 
paper and the year acted as controls. For abortion, Cohort 1 has a Somers’ D of .205 in 1984. In 
1988 this numbers dips to .158 before rising to .238 in 1992. In 1996, the Somers’ D for abortion 
was .339% and in 2000 this number is .283. Cohort 1 has a clear upward trend in their Somers’ D 
for abortion, and this means that the individuals who make up Cohort 1 increasingly associate 
their issue positions on abortion with their ideology. When the data on Cohort 2 is observed, 
their Somers’ D was .119 in 1988.  In 1992 it was .184 and in 1996 this number was .237. In 
2000 and 2004 the Somers’ D was .221 and .242, respectively. For Cohort 3, the Somers’ D was 
.236 in 1992, .315 in 1996 and .239 in 2000. The data on Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 
provide some interesting observations. First, Cohort 1 maintains a higher Somers’ D than Cohort 
2 and Cohort 3 do for abortion throughout the data, and the relationship between ideology and 
issue positions on abortion is weaker for the younger cohorts since the younger cohorts enter 
with a weaker relationship and the relationship stays weaker. The younger cohorts coming into 
the data after Cohort 1 place less emphasis on their issue positions on abortion when describing 
their ideology, then. Another clear pattern in the data is the general upward trend in Somers’ D 
for all three cohorts, meaning that as the cohorts age, abortion increases in saliency across the 
board for Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3. Also present in the data is a clear period effect in 
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1996 when all Cohorts had an increase in the saliency of their abortion opinions, and this was 
also followed by a clear, slight drop off in saliency in 2000. All of the trends just described are 
illustrated well in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Somers’ D for Abortion Opinions 
Although not on the graph, it is also worth mentioning what Cohort 4 and Cohort 5 had 
for their Somers’ D on for abortion. In 1996, Cohort 4 has a Somers’ D of .230, in 2000 it was 
.352 and in 2004 it was .204. For Cohort 5, the Somers’ D was .045, in 2000, and in 2004 this 
number shoots up to .290. In short, Somers’ D on abortion opinions has shown that, in general, 
as people age there is more of a connection between ideology and opinions on abortion. The data 
also showed that younger cohorts put less emphasis on abortion opinions when forming their 
ideology, although they still follow the general trend of abortion being more important as they 
age. 
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Cohort 1 0.205 0.158 0.238 0.339 0.283
Cohort 2 0.119 0.184 0.237 0.221 0.242
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Somers’ D for Gay Rights 
 
 When Somers’ D is observed on opinions on gays serving in the military an opposite 
trend from what was observed for opinions on abortion is observed. That is, instead of opinions 
on gays serving in the military increasing in saliency, they decrease in saliency. However, like 
abortion, Somers’ D for opinions on gays serving in the military remains the most salient for 
Cohort 1 and is not as salient for the younger cohorts. Somers’ D for Cohort 1 was .294 in 1992, 
.252 in 1996 and .232 in 2000. For Cohort 2 in 1992 Somers’ D was .098, in 1996 it was .169, in 
2000 was .130 and in 2004 was .263. For Cohort 3 in 1992 Somers’ D was .220. In 1996 this 
number was .159 and in 2000 this number was .113. Figure 2 helps to graphically illustrate what 
the data are showing, which is the saliency of gays serving in the military for Cohort 1, Cohort 2 
and Cohort 3 is generally dropping. And although the saliency is generally dropping, the issue of 
gays serving in the military is always more salient for them, similar to how abortion was always 
more salient for Cohort 1. Cohort 4, who is not in the graph, had a Somers’ D of .196 in 1996, 
.223 in 2000 and .102 in 2004. Cohort 5, who is also not in the graph, had a Somers’ D of .357 in 












Figure 2 Somers’ D for Gay Rights Opinions  
Somers’ D for Affirmative Action 
 
 When Somers’ D is observed for affirmative action for Cohort 1 in 1992 it is .100. In 
1996 this number rises to .165, and in 2000 the number drops down to .07. For Cohort 2 the 
Somers’ D was .019 in 1992, .055 in 1996, .009 in 2000 and .067 in 2004. For Cohort 3, the 
Somers’ D was .019 in 1992, .004 in 1996 and .121 in 2000. The data on Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and 
Cohort 3 reveal some clear patterns. First, there is a period effect in 1996 where Cohort 1 and 
Cohort 2 increase the saliency of affirmative action before having it drop. This is similar to the 
temporary increase in saliency of opinions on abortion that was observed in the 1996 data on 
Somers’ D for abortion. Also, generally speaking, the issue of affirmative action is more salient 
for Cohort 1 than it is for any other Cohort, as were the issues of gays serving in the military and 
abortion. All of the issues observed so far have been social issues, and perhaps the 
1992 1996 2000 2004
Cohort 1 0.294 0.252 0.232
Cohort 2 0.098 0.169 0.13 0.263
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impressionable years of Cohort 1 caused Cohort 1 to have high salience on social issues. When 
economic issues are examined the opinions and Somers’ D statistic for these issues will be 
telling on how salient economic issues are for Cohort 1 compared to how salient social issues 
are. Also telling of affirmative action is how not salient it is for the cohorts compared to abortion 
and gays in the military. The Somers’ D statistic for opinions on abortion and gays in the military 
never dropped below .100 for Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3, whereas affirmative action has 
Somers’ D statistics below .01. In other words, affirmative action is just not very salient. Figure 
3 provides a graphic illustration of all of the aforementioned patterns. Cohort 4, who is not in the 
graph, had a Somers’ D of .212 in 1996, .084 in 2000 and .161 in 2004. Cohort 5 had a Somers’ 
D of .08 in 2000 and .204 in 2004. 
 




1992 1996 2000 2004
Cohort 1 0.1 0.165 0.07
Cohort 2 0.019 0.055 0.009 0.067
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OPINIONS ON FEDERAL WELFARE SPENDING AND FOOD STAMPS 
Opinions on Welfare 
 
 Examining opinions on welfare spending show some clear period effects from 1992 to 
1996 and 2000. 18% of Cohort 1 thought that welfare spending should increase in 1992. The 
percent of respondents in Cohort 1 who thought that more should be spent on welfare decreased 
by more than half to 8.9% in 1996. Cohort 2 shows a similar pattern. In 1992, 19% of Cohort 2 
thought that welfare spending should be increased. In 1996 this number dropped to 12% before 
rising again to 17.8% in 2000. Cohort 3, showing patterns as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2, had 21.8% 
say that welfare spending should be increased by the federal government in 1992. In 1996 this 
number dropped to 12.8% before rising to 19.4% in 2000. Cohort 1 and Cohort 3 are no longer in 
the data in 2004, but Cohort 2 had 25% say they think federal spending on welfare should be 
increased. The data are showing a very clear period effect here; a smaller percentage of all the 
cohorts thought that federal spending on welfare programs should increase when 1992 is 
compared to 1996, but from 1996 to 2000 all the cohorts thought more should be spent. So, the 
data convey a very clear, consistent period effect. This phenomenon, where people think 
spending should be increased on a certain issue after spending is cut or perceived as too low, is 
seen with many other issues. For example, Erikson and Tedin describe how people thought that 
defense spending should be increased during the Carter Administration (Erikson and Tedin 93). 
So, when people see spending is too low on a certain issue, oftentimes public opinion will shift 
towards in increase on spending for that issue until spending is increased. Indeed, once defense 
spending was increased, the amount of people thinking there should be an increase in defense 
spending fell dramatically. In short, people wanted increased defense spending and they got it, 
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and then less people thought there should be an increase in defense spending. For welfare, people 
thought there should be less spent and they got the cut, and then less people thought it should be 
cut. This makes it difficult to determine if opinions on welfare are becoming more conservative 
since they seem to be so dependent on short-term factors. 
Opinions on Food Stamps 
 
 In 1984, 25.2% of Cohort 1 thought that federal spending on food stamps should be 
increased. In 1988 this number drops to 23.9%. In 1992 and 1996 the percent of Cohort 1 who 
thought that federal spending on food stamps was 17.6% and 11.1%, respectively. In 2000, 
15.6% of Cohort 1 thought that federal spending on food stamps should increase, and this slight 
increase from 1996 represents the only increase in the percent of respondents from Cohort 1 who 
thought that more should be spent on food stamps. Overall, there is a strong downward trend in 
support of federal spending on food stamps in Cohort 1. 
 In 1988, 24.7% of Cohort 2 thought that the federal government should spend more on 
food stamps. In 1992 this number drops to 14.8%, and this is followed by another drop to 13.3% 
in 1996. In 2000 the percent of people in Cohort 2 who think that federal spending on food 
stamps drops again to 12.1%. Cohort 2 experienced the same trend Cohort 1 did, and that is a 
steady drop in support for increased federal spending on food stamps. So, opinions on food 
stamps become more conservative as for Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 as they age. 
 The pattern Cohort 3 shows in their support for federal spending on food stamps is 
distinctive from Cohort 1 and Cohort 2. In 1992, 19.6% of Cohort 3 thought that federal 
spending on food stamps should be increased. In 1996 this number dropped sharply to 8.5%. So 
far this pattern is in line with the pattern Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 follow. However, in 2000 the 
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number of people in Cohort 3 who think federal spending of food stamps should increase almost 
triples to 23%. This jump is obviously substantial, although seeing if this is a permanent jump or 
merely a temporary quirk is not possible since the data ends in 2000 for this particular variable. 
What is possible though is to see how salient this issue is for Cohort 3 when they are forming 
















SOMERS’ D FOR WELFARE AND FOOD STAMPS 
Somers’ D for Welfare 
 
When Somers’ D was calculated the independent variable was whatever issue position 
was being observed while the dependent variable was the 3 category liberal-conservative scale 
used earlier in this paper, while the cohort syntax described earlier in this paper and the year 
acted as control. The Somers’ D for welfare for Cohort 1 in 1992 was .163. In 1996 the Somers’ 
D for welfare for Cohort 1 rose to .193, and in 2000 this number increased to .203. So as Cohort 
1 aged throughout the years, the relationship between welfare opinions for those in Cohort 1 and 
their ideology is increasing. 
Cohort 2 had a Somers’ D of .03 in 1992. However, in 1996 the Somers’ D jumps 
significantly to .227, and this is followed by another jump to .266 in 2000. This is significant 
because when Somers’ D was observed for social issues earlier in this paper Cohort 2 did not 
come close to Cohort 1. So, this data help show what Cohort 2 is thinking about when they label 
themselves as a certain ideology, and this data shows that Cohort 2 is thinking more about 
economic issues as they age. 
Cohort 3 had a Somers’ D of .047 in 1992. While Cohort 2 also had a low Somers’ D in 
1992 followed by a large jump in 1996, Cohort 3 has no large jump in 1996 as their Somers’ D is 
.061 in 1996. A drop follows this to .032 in 2000. This data clearly show that Cohort 3 is not 
thinking of federal spending on welfare when they are thinking of their ideology. As a whole, the 
data show some strong generation effects, as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 have a strong connection 
between their self-described ideology and welfare spending opinions while Cohort 3 has a very 
weak connection between their welfare spending opinions and their ideology. It is important to 
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note that age effects are probably intermingled with generational effects since Cohort 3 is 
younger than Cohort 1 and Cohort 2. However, these effects are minimal at best and certainly do 
not explain why Cohort has such a low Somers’ D for welfare spending. All of the above data 
are displayed in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Somers’ D for Federal Welfare Spending Opinions 
 
 
Somers’ D for Food Stamps 
 
 When examining opinions of food stamp spending, in 1988 Cohort 1 had a Somers’ D of 
.067. This increased in 1992 and 1996 to .124 and .213, respectively. In 2000 this number 
dropped slightly to .101. Cohort 2 had a Somers’ D of .009 in 1988. The Somers’ D for Cohort 
rose sharply in 1992 in .123. In 1996 the Somers’ D increased to .229 before dropping to .129 in 
1992 1996 2000
Cohort 1 0.163 0.193 0.203
Cohort 2 0.03 0.227 0.266







































2000. Cohort 3 had a Somers’ D of .044 in 1992. In 1996 this increased to .083 before dropping 
to .054 in 2000. All of this data are displayed nicely in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 5 Somers’ D for Federal Spending on Food Stamps 
 This representation of the data helps graphically illustrate a few things. First, as with 
welfare spending opinions, Cohort 2 has a strong connection between their self-described 
ideology and their opinions on food stamps spending. Additionally, there is a period effect in 
1996 that even Cohort 3 is a part in where all the cohorts have an increased relationship between 
their self-described ideology and their opinions on food stamps spending. It is also worth noting 
that Cohort 2 has a higher Somers’ D than Cohort 1 even after the period effect is over and all 
the Somers’ D values drop in 2000. Cohort 3 consistently has the lowest Somers’ D out of the 
three cohorts here, just like they did when the Somers’ D for welfare was observed. This cements 
the fact that Cohort 3 is not thinking about economic issues when they are self-describing their 
1988 1992 1996 2000
Cohort 1 0.067 0.124 0.213 0.101
Cohort 2 0.009 0.123 0.229 0.129
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ideology, or at least not government spending on social programs. However, just like when 
Somers’ D values were being observed for welfare, there are age effects being intermingled with 
generational effects, although once again age effects are certainly not solely responsible for the 
substantial discrepancies between Cohort 3 and Cohort 1/ Cohort 2. Although it is interesting 
that not even Cohort 3 was immune from the period effect in 1996. It is also worth noting that 
while Cohort 1 seemed to be the cohort that heavily identified with social issues, Cohort 2 seems 

















POLITCAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
Levels of Political Knowledge 
 
 When levels of political knowledge are observed, clear-cut and unsurprising results are 
seen in the data. Without exception, each cohort is getting more knowledgeable as they age and 
this is evidenced by the fact that as each cohort ages, they all have an increased number of 
respondents categorized as having “Fairly High” or “Very High” levels of political information. 
Also telling it the fact that each time a “new” cohort appeared in the data for the first time it had 
a lower number of people categorized as “Fairly High” or “Very High” when compared to all the 
cohorts that had come before it (so Cohort 2 had a lower number of people categorized as having 
“Fairly High” or “Very High” levels of political knowledge when it first entered the data in 1988 
compared to Cohort 1, and Cohort 3 had lower levels compared to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 when it 
entered the data in 1992 and so on). For example, in 1992 Cohort 1 15.9% labeled as having 
“Very High” knowledge, while Cohort 2 had 10.1% labeled as “Very High” and Cohort 3 had 
6.6%. In the same year, Cohort 1 had 30.6% labeled as having “Fairly High” political 
knowledge, while Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 had 28.6% and 24.4% labeled as “Fairly High”, 
respectively. The reasons for older citizens being more informed compared to younger citizens is 
not much of a surprise. As Clawson and Oxley explain, “As people progress through the life 
cycle, they are simply exposed to more political information. Older citizens have more 
experiences, such as buying a house and paying property taxes, that younger people are less 
likely to have” (Clawson and Oxley 199). In others words, older people are simply exposed to 
more things that make them want to be politically informed, and young people are generally not 
exposed to the same experiences. Age also impacts how much each of the age cohorts turns out 
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to vote. As Lewis-Beck et al. explain, “Voting, for many citizens, is an acquired taste, and the 
appetite grows with eating” (Lewis-Beck 103). So, age impacts voter turnout in addition to 
political knowledge. While this data show how levels of political information are related to age, 
there are also many other variables intermingled with age such as income, education, and gender 
among countless others. So then, the next analysis will look at the same data while controlling 
for education to ascertain any new information the controlled data illustrates. 
Levels of Political Knowledge with Education Acting as a Control 
 
 When the data is looked at with education acting as a control the profound influence 
education has on political knowledge is shown. For example, in 1996 those in Cohort 1 with no 
education higher than the high school level had 3.1% with “Very High” political knowledge, 
while Cohort 2 had 4.5%, and Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 had 0% with “Very High” knowledge. 
Those from Cohort 1 with a college education or advanced degree in 1996 had 23.2% with “Very 
High” knowledge, while Cohort 2 had 34.2%, Cohort 3 had 23.4%, and Cohort 4 had 14.3% with 
“Very High” political knowledge. It is also worth to note that in 1996, among those with a 
college degree or an advanced degree in Cohort 1, the percentage of people with below average 
political knowledge (“Fairly Low” or “Very Low” political knowledge) makes up less than 2% 
of respondents. Indeed, when only the college educated or those with advanced degrees are 
observed for any cohort in 1996, every cohort has less than 20% with below average political 
knowledge. These patterns observed in 1996 are indicative of what is seen throughout all of the 
years and cohorts within the data. While the data undoubtedly show the importance of age since 
there is a general (though imperfect) increase in political knowledge in each of the cohorts as 
they age, the profound impact of education on political knowledge can hardly be overstated. 
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Niemi and Junn say that, “…formal education is the single most important factor differentiating 
those who know more about politics from those who know less” (Niemi and Junn 13). So, the 
control of education has illustrated an important point. While initially the data showed age as a 
very strong indicator of political knowledge, the control of education has shown that education is 
in fact the strongest indicator of political knowledge while age is still a factor, though less 
important. 
Interest in Public Affairs 
 
 When data on the interest people have in public affairs is observed, some clear patterns 
emerge as the cohorts age. For example, Cohort 1 had 50.4% following public affairs at least 
some of the time in 1984. In 1988 this number dips to 48.7% before jumping to 66.4% in 1992. 
In 1996, 57.6% of Cohort 1 followed public affairs at least some of the time and in 2000 this 
percent stayed about the same at 59.2%. The data for Cohort 2 show a similar pattern with a 
general upward trend in the percentage of people that follow public affairs at least some of the 
time. In 1988, 45.4% of Cohort 2 followed politics some of the time, at a minimum. In 1992 this 
number rises to 59.8% before falling to 44.6% in 1996. In 2000 the percentage of Cohort 2 
following politics at least some of the time rises to 53.4%, and in 2004 the percentage of people 
in Cohort 2 following politics at least some of the time rises again to 64%. Cohort 3 had 56.1% 
of people following politics at least some of the time in 1992. In 1996 this number dips to 51.4%, 
and in 2000 this number stays steady at 50%. Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 show a pattern of increasing 
interest in public affairs, although this pattern is certainly not perfect. Still, the relationship 
between age and increased interest in public affairs is obvious. Clawson and Oxley note that, 
“…those with more education and higher incomes are more concerned with political happenings. 
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Age, in particular, has a strong relationship with political interest” (Clawson and Oxley 204-
205). As the data have shown, and as Clawson and Oxley have noted, there is a strong 
relationship between interest in public affairs and age. Indeed, this relationship is seen across all 
of the cohorts. But, it is possible education is playing a large, hidden role in the data. And as 
Clawson and Oxley noted, education plays a role in interest in public affairs in addition to age.  
Interest in Public Affairs with Education Acting as a Control 
 
 When the data on interest in public affairs has education acting as a control, the strong 
relationship between education and interest in public affairs is revealed. The first thing that 
stands out when education is controlled for is the overall higher percentages of respondents who 
follow public affairs. For example, those in Cohort 1 with a high school education had 61.1% 
following public affairs at least some of the time in 1996, and this was the highest percentage of 
respondents following politics at least some of the time for those in Cohort 1 with a high school 
education. The next highest percentage of people in Cohort 1 with a high school education was 
50.5% in 1992. Those in Cohort 1 with a college degree or higher had their lowest percentage of 
people following politics at least some of the time in 1996 (which is coincidentally the same year 
those in Cohort 1 with a high school education had their highest percentage) at 63.5%. So, even 
when the people in Cohort 1 with a high school education have their highest percentage 
compared to the lowest percentage of those in Cohort 1 with a college degree or higher, those 
with a college degree or higher still follow politics more. And it is important to point out that for 
Cohort 1 as a whole 1996 seems to be an anomaly, as the data points for those in Cohort 1 with a 
high school education and those with a college degree or higher are uncharacteristically high and 
low, respectively. And yet despite this apparent anomaly, those with a college degree or higher 
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still follow politics more, showing just how important education is. Cohort 2 shows a similar 
pattern to Cohort 1 in that education proves to be an important factor in how much the cohort 
follows politics. For example, for those in Cohort 2 with a high school education, 38.8% 
followed public affairs at least some of the time in 1988, 42.4% in 1992, 37.3% in 1996 and 
28.9% in 2000. Those in cohort 2 with at least a college degree had 76% follow politics at least 
some of the time in 1988. In 1992 this number jumped to 83% before dipping to 55.5% in 1996. 
In 2000 this number jumped back up to 72.6%. So then, Cohort 2 confirms what was seen in the 
data for Cohort 1; that is, education plays a significant role in exactly how interested people are 
in public affairs, and it would be wrong to attribute interest in public affairs solely to age. 
 Observing what the cohorts thought the most important national problem facing the U.S. 
before the Soviet Union fell and after the Soviet Union fell provides an opportunity to test just 
how strong period effects can be. As Bartels puts it, “The end of the Cold War… provides a 
remarkable opportunity to examine the dynamics of opinion change in the face of fundamental 
changes in the context and political underpinnings of U.S. defense policy” (479). In other words, 
the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity to examine a potential period effect unlike 






OPINIONS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEM AND 
THE STANDING OF THE U.S. BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 
Opinions on the Most Important National Problem 
 
 In 1984 when Cohort 1 was asked what they thought the most important national problem 
was, 39% answered “Foreign Affairs and National Defense”. In 1988 as the Cold War was 
calming down, this number is cut by more than half to 14.5%. 1988 was also the first year 
Cohort 2 was in the data, and they had 11.9% of people say that “Foreign Affairs and National 
Defense” was the most important national problem facing the United States. So, both Cohort 1 
and Cohort 2 had their perceptions on what they thought the most important national was 
impacted by the ending of the Cold War. In 1992, only 3.3% of Cohort 1 thought that “Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense” was the most important national problem, while Cohort 2 and 
Cohort 3 had 1.7% and 4.7% who thought that “Foreign Affairs and National Defense” was the 
most important problem, respectively. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde say that there was a, 
“…lower concern over foreign than domestic issues in 1992…” (185). The data support this 
since as the percentage of people who thought that “Foreign Affairs and National Defense” was 
the most important national problem dropped, the percentage of people who thought that 
“Economics” and “Social Welfare” were the most important national problem increased. 
Therefore, the data illustrate a few points. First, all of the cohorts were affected by the ending of 
the Cold War equally. That is, the period effect was so strong that it affected all of the cohorts 
basically equally, not just the young. However, this is not to say that period effects always 
impact the young and the old alike. Rather, this is just a good example of how some period 
effects are so strong they cut across cohort lines and impact everybody basically the same way. 
So in short, the data here illustrate a very strong period effect but should not be taken as 
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indicative of all period effects since the ending of the Cold War was a very special and unique 
event. 
Opinions on the World Standing of the U.S. Before and After 9/11 
 
 Another type of unique, powerful period effect happened between 2000 and 2004 when 
opinions on the world position of the United States were recorded. Between 2000 and 2004 the 
9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in addition to the invasion of Iraq. Obviously, two traumatic 
events happened in a relatively short amount of time, and the impact on opinions on the standing 
of the United States in the world should yield interesting results. The data in this study was 
collected at two points, in pre-9/11 in 2000 and post-9/11 and after the invasion of Iraq in 2004. 
Saad has identified five major stages of public opinion between 2000 and 2004. These stages are 
“Pre-9/11”, “Post-9/11”, “Pre-Iraq War”, “Iraq War Rally’, and “Post Iraq War” (Saad 1). The 
data in this study were only collected from 2000 and 2004, or roughly “Pre-9/11” and “Post Iraq 
War”, so it is important to be aware that between these two stages there was fluctuation of 
opinions that are invisible in the data in this study. But, the two years of data used in this study 
are also the most reliable since they are taken from before and after most of the fluctuation 
happened. 
 In 2000, Cohort 2 had 31.6% of respondents say they thought the position of the United 
States was weaker compared to previous years. Cohort 4 had 24.8% of respondents say they 
thought the position of the United States was weaker compared to earlier years while Cohort 5 
had 16.1%. In 2004, after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, Cohort 1 had 38.6% of respondents say 
they thought the position of the United States was weaker. Cohort 4 had 45.9% say they thought 
the position of the United States was weaker, compared to 24.8% in 2000. Cohort 5 had 61.2% 
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say they thought the position of the United States was weaker in 2994 compared to 16.1% in 
2000. Obviously, the younger cohorts, Cohort 4 and Cohort 5, were more influenced by the 
world events at the time. These opinions expressing a perceived weaker standing for the United 
States in the world have a lot to do with the “Post Iraq War” stage, as the causalities and realities 
of the Iraq War set in after the “Iraq War Rally” stage (Saad 1). When the data is broken down 
more into age cohorts like in this study, it becomes very clear that the young in Cohort 4 and 
Cohort 5 were influenced much more by the period than the older were in Cohort 2. In short, the 
data on the perceived standing of the United States before and after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq 
are a good example of how the young can be more influenced by events while the old are not 














SOURCES OF NEWS 
Newspaper Reading 
 
 Studies have continuously shown that reading newspapers is a strong predictor of 
political knowledge. As Chaffee and Frank put it, “It is, indeed, rare to find a study in which 
newspaper reading is not a significant predictor of political knowledge” (48). So, it is safe to say 
that almost every study investigating the impact of newspaper reading deems it having a very 
strong connection to political knowledge. This is important knowledge to have as we look at the 
newspaper reading habits of each of the cohorts throughout the years since it will tell us what 
reading (or not reading) newspapers means for people. Also, when looking a newspaper 
readership, the percentages calculated represent who reads the newspaper at least four times a 
week. 
 In 1984 Cohort 1 had 32.9% of respondents read the newspaper at least four times a 
week. In 1988 this number rose to 40.8%, and in 1992 this number stays basically the same at 
39%. And in 1996 the percentage of people in Cohort 1 who read the newspaper at least 4 times 
a week holds steady at 38.9%. In 2000 the respondents from Cohort 1 who read the newspaper at 
least four times a week dips to 35%. So, then, Cohort 1 has an overall upward trend in the 
percentage of respondents who read newspapers at a minimum of four times a week. This is not 
surprising, since earlier in this study it was revealed that political knowledge and the need to be 
informed increase with age. Cohort 2 shows a very similar pattern to Cohort 1, having 35.9% of 
respondents read the newspaper at least four times a week in 1988, the first year Cohort 2 is in 
the data. In 1992 this number dips to 33.9% before dipping again to 30.4% in 1996. In 2000 this 
number jumps up to 37.3%. While the rises in newspaper readership are not as strong in Cohort 2 
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as they are in Cohort 1, overall the patterns for the two cohorts are very similar. While Cohort 1 
and Cohort 2 show very similar levels of newspaper readership, Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 do not 
have the same levels as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2. 
 The first year Cohort 3 comes into the data is 1992, and the percentage of respondents 
who read the newspaper four days a week is 25.6%. In 1996 this number holds steady at 25.4% 
before rising slightly to 28% in 2000. Cohort 4, who enters the data in 1996, has 26.5% of the 
Cohort reading newspapers at least four times a week the first year it enters the data. In 2000, 
Cohort 4 has 25.7% of respondents who read newspapers at least four times a week. The trends 
Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 are showing are different than those Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 are showing 
because they are starting with substantially lower levels of initial readership of newspapers. In 
2004, data is only available for Cohort 2 and Cohort 4. Cohort 2 had 45% of respondents read the 
newspaper a minimum of four times a week, while Cohort 4 only had 24.8%, so the patters seen 
earlier continue on in 2004. Indeed, there is a clear distinction between Cohort 1/ Cohort 2 and 
Cohort 3/ Cohort 4. Perhaps Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 rely more heavily on news programs on the 
television to get their information, or perhaps they are not as interested in being informed about 
public affairs. No matter the cause, there is without a doubt a clear divide in the cohorts with 
regard to their newspaper reading habits, and perhaps a look at who watches televised news 
programs would help clear up the discrepancy.  
National Television News Programs 
 
 When the cohorts were examined to see how often they watched national news on the 
television, percentages were calculated to determine who watched the national news at least four 
times a week. For Cohort 1 in 1984, 29.9% of Cohort 1 watched the national news at a minimum 
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of four times a week. In 1988 this number jumped to 56.9% for Cohort 1. For Cohort 2 in the 
same year this number was 58.7%. In 1992, Cohort 1 had 55.8% of respondents watch the 
national news at least four times a week. Cohort 2 had 53.5% in 1992 while Cohort 3 had 47.3%. 
It is worth noting that the percentage of respondents from Cohort 3 who watch the national news 
are much closer to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 compared to the percentages for newspaper readership. 
In 1996 Cohort 1 had 34.2% of respondents who watched the national news at least four times a 
day while Cohort 2 had 29.2%. Cohort 3 had 30.5%, while Cohort 4 had 17.9%. These 
percentages are a substantial drop from the 1992 numbers, and in 2000 it is obvious that these 
drops are not a fluke. The 2000 numbers are 30.6% for Cohort 1, 32.8% for Cohort 2, 21.6% for 
Cohort 3 and 25.7% for Cohort 4. Before the period effect in 1996, Cohort 3 had a similar 
percent of people who watched the national news at least four times a week compared to Cohort 
1 and Cohort 2. The reason for this drop, according to Clawson and Oxley, was a change in the 
content shown on the national news from “hard news” to “soft news” (63). This basically means 
that news stations shifted their focus from news related to public policy to news items not 
connected to public policy. This was done as a result of increased competition by news stations 
and so was meant to increase rankings, although ironically it seems to have decreased news 
viewership. So, news viewership initially appeared to be different than newspaper readership, but 
the period effect in 1996 fundamentally changed news viewership, and therefore makes it 
difficult to draw any definite conclusions other than the fact that there was indeed a very 
powerful period effect in 1996. So, from the data in this study, it would seem that Cohort 3 and 
Cohort 4 pay less attention to public affairs compared to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2, since they do 
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not read newspapers as much and they do not watch the national news enough to make up for 
their lack of newspaper reading. 
The Internet as a Source of Campaign Information 
 
 The internet, a relatively new and extremely powerful medium, has recently come into 
play in the political arena. The American National Election Survey Questionnaire has 
unfortunately not caught up to this new medium, so there are very few questions related to the 
internet in the survey. One of the few questions available will be analyzed, though. From 1996 to 
2004, people were asked if they had received election information off the internet, and 
respondents answered with a simple “Yes” or “No”. In 1996, 27.3% of Cohort 2 received 
election information off the internet while 31.9% of Cohort 4 did. In 2000, 54.6% of Cohort 2 
received election information off the internet, while 53.6% of Cohort 4 did as well as 53.3% of 
Cohort 5. In 2004, 75% of Cohort 2 received election information off the internet. Cohort 4 and 
Cohort 5 had 71.7% and 72.4%, respectively. Obviously, the internet is becoming a medium that 
went from being used by less than a third of each cohort in 1996 to being used by about three 
fourths of each cohort in 2004 for campaign information. It is obvious the internet is becoming 
what is perhaps the most powerful campaign tool and will continue to have an important role in 




CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
 In closing, this study covered a broad range of topics in the political realm while trying to 
decipher the impact age has on political socialization. First, the U.S. Presidential elections from 
1984 to 2004 were analyzed. The data illustrated how George H.W. Bush was not immune to 
strong period effects of the time. Indeed, all the cohorts in this study thought that the economy 
was more important than foreign affairs; even the youngest cohorts who are most detached from 
the economy felt this way, demonstrating how powerful the period effect was. This means that 
all the cohorts were less likely to vote for Bush, and this period effect that impacted all cohorts 
contributed to Bush’s defeat in 1992. In addition to the changing perceptions the public had on 
what the most pressing national problem was, Ross Perot entered the Presidential elections of 
1992 and 1996. The data showed how Cohort 2 voted more for Perot than Cohort 1, and this was 
to be expected since Cohort 2 is younger than Cohort 1, and so the views of Cohort 2 were more 
elastic. Additionally, the 2000 elections prove that the voting patterns of the cohorts fit the 
impressionable years model. So, the 1984-2000 elections proved to have many different period 
effects. But, when the voting patterns of Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 were analyzed, the 
impressionable years model fit the data the best. Also, when strength of preference for 
Presidential vote was examined, no clear patterns emerged regarding age and strength of 
preference. However, this is due to the fact that strength of preference has a lot to do with short- 
term factors (e.g. personality characteristics of the candidates). What was more telling of 
strengthening partisanship as people age was simply measuring the percentage of strong 
partisans in each age cohort throughout the years. 
 
49 
 When the percentages of “Strong Partisans” were calculated for the cohorts throughout 
the years the trends fit the impressionable years model very well. Each cohort had a higher 
percentage of “Strong Partisans” as they got older. When ideology was looked at each cohort 
also got more conservative, according to their self-classification. However, what this meant 
exactly was not initially clear. In other words, people identifying themselves as more 
conservative could mean that people were actually getting more conservative, or it could mean 
that people merely thought they were getting more conservative. When views on abortion were 
examined, they did not become more conservative along with the respondents’ self-identifying 
ideology. Indeed, abortion views become more liberal. Even conservatives were more permissive 
of abortion as they aged when Party ID was controlled for. Indeed, if respondents were really 
becoming more conservative, it was certainly not because of their abortion views. By contrast, 
people did in fact become more conservative as they aged in their views towards affirmative 
action. That is, as the cohorts aged, they generally had less support for affirmative action 
programs. When views on gay rights were observed, specifically whether or not gays should be 
able to serve openly in the military, respondents became more permissive of gays serving in the 
military. This means that the opinions of the cohorts generally became more liberal regarding 
gay rights, and so this issue did not match the growing self-identifying conservatism of the 
cohorts. 
 The Somers’ D values for each of these issues gives some insight into how much weight 
the cohorts give each issue when they identify their ideology. The Somers’ D values for abortion 
had an upward trend for all of the cohorts. Cohort 1 started with the highest Somers’ D and 
maintained it throughout the data despite the general upward trend shown by all the cohorts. Gay 
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rights, on the other hand, had a general decrease in saliency. Interestingly, Cohort 1 maintains a 
higher Somers’ D for gay rights throughout the general downward trend in the data. When 
Somers’ D was calculated for affirmative action the statistics showed that affirmative action is 
not very salient for people compared to abortion and gay rights. It is also worth to note that 
Cohort 1 seems to place a high emphasis on social issues when they are forming their ideology, 
as shown by their high Somers’ D values for abortion and gay rights when compared to Cohort 2 
and Cohort 3. 
 Opinions on welfare spending had similar trends in opinion for all of the cohorts. All of 
the cohorts thought that spending should be increased, and then decreased. Once welfare 
spending was decreased, people then thought it should be increased. This is similar to a period 
effect during the Carter Administration and Reagan Administration, where people wanted an 
increase in spending for defense, and then once it was increased people wanted it decreased. In 
other words, sometimes in public opinion people want something, and once they get it they want 
the opposite. It is also difficult to determine if opinions on welfare are becoming more 
conservative or not since they seem to be impacted so much by short- term forces. When 
opinions on food stamps were examined there was a clear downward trend in support for food 
stamps, with the exception of Cohort 3 in the year 2000, when they had a sharp increase in 
support for the program. Overall though, opinions on food stamps generally become more 
conservative for the cohorts as they age. 
 When Somers’ D was calculated for welfare spending there was a general increase in 
saliency for Cohort 1 as well as for Cohort 2, while Cohort 3 had a Somers’ D that remained low 
and stable. It is also worth noting while Cohort 1 had the highest Somers’ D values for social 
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issues, Cohort 2 has a higher Somers’ D for welfare opinions once it ages a bit. So, it would 
seem Cohort 1 is thinking more of social issues when they form their ideology. This is reinforced 
by the Somers’ D values for food stamps, where Cohort 2 once again has a higher Somers’ D 
higher than Cohort 1 once the people in Cohort 2 aged a bit. 
 When political knowledge and interest in public affairs was examined, there was a very 
strong relationship between the variables and age. However, when education acted as a control 
when these variables were being observed, it revealed the very strong relationship the variables 
had with education, in addition to age. So, political knowledge and interest in public affairs are 
strongly related to both age and education.  
When data on the most important national problem was in the eyes’ of the cohorts before 
and after the Cold War, it was revealed that the period effect of the ending of the Cold War was 
so strong that it impacted all cohorts about the same. This is evident in the data from the fact that 
all the cohorts thought that “Foreign Affairs and National Defense” was becoming less and less 
of a major problem compared to domestic issues after the Cold War was over. When data on the 
perceived standing of the United States was viewed, it showed how the young were more 
impacted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks since they had a bigger change in their opinions of the 
world standing of the United States after 9/11. 
When data on news sources was analyzed, it was revealed that Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 
read the newspaper at similarly high levels. Cohort 3 and Cohort 4, on the other hand, read them 
at similarly low levels. National news programs on the television have seen a dramatically lower 
amount of viewers since the mid-90’s across all cohorts. This was due to a change in content 
across all major news networks because of the competition between them. It was also revealed 
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that about 75% of each cohort got election information off the internet in 2004, showing how 
powerful the internet will be for future elections.  
The reasons why some political opinions and orientations are stable, while others are fluid and 
frequently changing, are not easy to come by. Indeed, by looking at the data in this study, no 
clear-cut answers immediately jump out. While no concrete answers are available it is certainly 
possible to make some speculations as to why opinions change the way they do. Additionally, 
the data in this study showed people holding conflicting opinions at times. For example, most 
people thought they were getting more conservative as they aged, and yet these same people 
came to hold what are considered liberal opinions on some issues. 
 Some issues were clearly influenced by short- term effects and therefore explaining why 
these particular issues changed frequently is relatively simple. A good example of an issue that is 
strongly impacted by short-term effects is strength of Presidential vote choice. At first I 
hypothesized that respondents would have stronger Presidential vote preferences as they got 
older, similar to how people have stronger partisanship towards a certainly ideology as they age, 
but the data did not support this. After consulting outside information, it became clear that the 
data did not support this because strength of preference relies almost exclusively on short-term 
factors such as the personality or looks of a particular candidate. So, what may appear to be a 
non-attitude in certain instances may just reflect an issue that relies on short-term factors. 
 While some issue opinions depend almost solely on short-term effects, there are other 
issues that are impacted heavily by short-term effects only in certain instances, and not knowing 
about the impact these short-term effects have would have made the translation of what the data 
was representing much different. For example, the data on the Presidential elections in 1992 and 
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1996 first appeared to be anomalies because of the high percentage of votes independent 
candidates were getting. However, it quickly became clear those years were effected heavily by 
short-term effects, since Perot was in both of those elections, and the vote choices went back to 
“normal” once Perot was not in the picture any more in 2000. Another issue significantly 
impacted by short-term effects was gay rights; specifically, the right for homosexuals to serve 
openly in the military. This effect started in the mid and late 90’s and continued on into the 
2000’s and it changed opinions towards homosexuals towards more rights for them. Whether this 
change is permanent is yet to be seen, but the point is that short-term effects can significantly 
alter the way the data look and the way it is interpreted. So, this data have shown the impact of 
short-term effects cannot be under estimated, as well as the fact that what may appear to be 
inconsistencies or anomalies in the data are actually be manipulated by short-term factors. 
 While short-term factors have shown to be quite a force in certain instances there are of 
course some things that short-term effects cannot account for.  One of the things short-term 
effects cannot account for is the contradictory opinions the cohorts had as they aged where they 
continually self-identified themselves as more conservative, and also came to hold more liberal 
issue positions. The best example of this is the opinions on abortion examined in this study 
where people became more liberal with their abortion opinions as they aged. So then, for 
opinions that cannot be influenced heavily by short-term factors such as abortion and ideology, 
why do people hold these opinions? And do these opinions mean anything? I think it would be 
helpful to go back to a quote from The American Voter from earlier in this study that says, “…in 
general the Republican Party has an air of respectability, conservatism, and social status which 
the Democratic Party does not fully share. If we assume that these values have an increasing 
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appeal to older people we have the essential conditions for the creation of an age dimension in 
political partisanship” (Campbell et al. 165-166). Perhaps as people age and they are self-
identifying their ideology they are thinking more of a particular image and status they would like 
to have, and not what party or ideology their issue positions line up with. I think this is the most 
plausible reason for why, as this study showed, ideology and issue positions are not always a 
perfect match. Indeed, this explanation fits the data well and other studies, such as the one in The 
American Voter, show similar results. Of course, the hypothesis that people are not thinking of 
their issue positions as they identify their ideology as they get older is just that, a hypothesis. It is 
important to make clear that these could be nonattitudes, and people have contradictory opinions 
because they have very little political knowledge. However, I think in this particular situation, 
the criteria people have for their Party ID as they age is the best explanation. I also think future 
research should focus on what people are thinking when they express contradictory opinions. For 
example, follow up questions once contradictory opinions are identified in a study could simply 
ask people how they came to their self-identified Party ID and also a contradictory issue position. 
I think the most important research in political opinions and orientations in the future will focus 
on the thought processes people go through when they form contradictory opinions like this. 
While definite answers may never be available I think going towards trying to get these answers 
is the next step in research like this. 












APPENDIX A: AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY DATA USED 




Table 1 Presidential Vote Choice 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Party of Pres Vote- Major 
Parties, 
1. Democrat Count 74     74 
% within cohort 42.5%     42.5% 
2. Republican Count 98     98 
% within cohort 56.3%     56.3% 
3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor 
party candidates and write-
ins) 
Count 2     2 
% within cohort 1.1%     1.1% 
Total Count 174     174 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Party of Pres Vote- Major 
Parties, 
1. Democrat Count 44 52    96 
% within cohort 49.4% 47.3%    48.2% 
2. Republican Count 45 57    102 
% within cohort 50.6% 51.8%    51.3% 
3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor 
party candidates and write-
ins) 
Count 0 1    1 
% within cohort .0% .9%    .5% 
Total Count 89 110    199 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 Party of Pres Vote- Major 
Parties, 
1. Democrat Count 78 57 81   216 
% within cohort 41.7% 39.9% 50.0%   43.9% 
2. Republican Count 75 43 40   158 
% within cohort 40.1% 30.1% 24.7%   32.1% 
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3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor 
party candidates and write-
ins) 
Count 34 43 41   118 
% within cohort 18.2% 30.1% 25.3%   24.0% 
Total Count 187 143 162   492 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Party of Pres Vote- Major 
Parties, 
1. Democrat Count 59 46 43 35  183 
% within cohort 47.6% 49.5% 61.4% 50.7%  51.4% 
2. Republican Count 57 33 19 24  133 
% within cohort 46.0% 35.5% 27.1% 34.8%  37.4% 
3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor 
party candidates and write-
ins) 
Count 8 14 8 10  40 
% within cohort 6.5% 15.1% 11.4% 14.5%  11.2% 
Total Count 124 93 70 69  356 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Party of Pres Vote- Major 
Parties, 
1. Democrat Count 51 50 29 35 50 215 
% within cohort 46.4% 45.5% 36.3% 56.5% 58.1% 48.0% 
2. Republican Count 56 55 47 24 29 211 
% within cohort 50.9% 50.0% 58.8% 38.7% 33.7% 47.1% 
3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor 
party candidates and write-
ins) 
Count 3 5 4 3 7 22 
% within cohort 2.7% 4.5% 5.0% 4.8% 8.1% 4.9% 
Total Count 110 110 80 62 86 448 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Party of Pres Vote- Major 
Parties, 
1. Democrat Count  23  47 35 105 
% within cohort  41.8%  45.2% 60.3% 48.4% 
2. Republican Count  31  55 22 108 
% within cohort  56.4%  52.9% 37.9% 49.8% 
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3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor 
party candidates and write-
ins) 
Count  1  2 1 4 
% within cohort  1.8%  1.9% 1.7% 1.8% 
Total Count  55  104 58 217 




Table 2 Most Opinions on Most Important National Problem 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Most Important National 
Problem (1) 
01. Agricultural Count 2     2 




Count 96     96 
% within cohort 31.2%     31.2% 
03. Foreign Affairs & 
National Defense 
Count 120     120 
% within cohort 39.0%     39.0% 
04. Government Functioning Count 5     5 
% within cohort 1.6%     1.6% 
06. Natural Resources Count 2     2 
% within cohort .6%     .6% 
07. Public Order Count 11     11 
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% within cohort 3.6%     3.6% 
08. Racial Problems Count 1     1 
% within cohort .3%     .3% 
09. Social Welfare Count 69     69 
% within cohort 22.4%     22.4% 
97. Other problems Count 2     2 
% within cohort .6%     .6% 
Total Count 308     308 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Most Important National 
Problem (1) 
01. Agricultural Count 2 2    4 




Count 61 75    136 
% within cohort 40.1% 33.2%    36.0% 
03. Foreign Affairs & 
National Defense 
Count 22 27    49 
% within cohort 14.5% 11.9%    13.0% 
04. Government Functioning Count 2 3    5 
% within cohort 1.3% 1.3%    1.3% 
05. Labor Issues Count 0 1    1 
% within cohort .0% .4%    .3% 
06. Natural Resources Count 9 16    25 
% within cohort 5.9% 7.1%    6.6% 
07. Public Order Count 18 50    68 
% within cohort 11.8% 22.1%    18.0% 
08. Racial Problems Count 2 0    2 
% within cohort 1.3% .0%    .5% 
09. Social Welfare Count 35 52    87 
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% within cohort 23.0% 23.0%    23.0% 
97. Other problems Count 1 0    1 
% within cohort .7% .0%    .3% 
Total Count 152 226    378 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 





Count 98 75 91   264 
% within cohort 46.7% 41.4% 38.7%   42.2% 
03. Foreign Affairs & 
National Defense 
Count 7 3 11   21 
% within cohort 3.3% 1.7% 4.7%   3.4% 
04. Government Functioning Count 4 5 2   11 
% within cohort 1.9% 2.8% .9%   1.8% 
06. Natural Resources Count 4 3 5   12 
% within cohort 1.9% 1.7% 2.1%   1.9% 
07. Public Order Count 22 24 23   69 
% within cohort 10.5% 13.3% 9.8%   11.0% 
08. Racial Problems Count 2 6 5   13 
% within cohort 1.0% 3.3% 2.1%   2.1% 
09. Social Welfare Count 73 65 97   235 
% within cohort 34.8% 35.9% 41.3%   37.5% 
97. Other problems Count 0 0 1   1 
% within cohort .0% .0% .4%   .2% 
Total Count 210 181 235   626 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 





Count 14 12 16 13  55 
% within cohort 17.3% 17.4% 27.1% 20.3%  20.1% 
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03. Foreign Affairs & 
National Defense 
Count 2 1 1 0  4 
% within cohort 2.5% 1.4% 1.7% .0%  1.5% 
04. Government Functioning Count 2 3 1 2  8 
% within cohort 2.5% 4.3% 1.7% 3.1%  2.9% 
06. Natural Resources Count 2 0 2 2  6 
% within cohort 2.5% .0% 3.4% 3.1%  2.2% 
07. Public Order Count 31 20 15 14  80 
% within cohort 38.3% 29.0% 25.4% 21.9%  29.3% 
08. Racial Problems Count 2 1 2 0  5 
% within cohort 2.5% 1.4% 3.4% .0%  1.8% 
09. Social Welfare Count 27 32 22 33  114 
% within cohort 33.3% 46.4% 37.3% 51.6%  41.8% 
97. Other problems Count 1 0 0 0  1 
% within cohort 1.2% .0% .0% .0%  .4% 
Total Count 81 69 59 64  273 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 





Count 12 14 9 7 15 57 
% within cohort 12.9% 17.1% 12.5% 13.2% 16.5% 14.6% 
03. Foreign Affairs & 
National Defense 
Count 8 6 7 4 8 33 
% within cohort 8.6% 7.3% 9.7% 7.5% 8.8% 8.4% 
04. Government Functioning Count 4 2 4 1 5 16 
% within cohort 4.3% 2.4% 5.6% 1.9% 5.5% 4.1% 
05. Labor Issues Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 
% within cohort .0% .0% .0% 1.9% .0% .3% 
06. Natural Resources Count 2 4 0 1 4 11 
% within cohort 2.2% 4.9% .0% 1.9% 4.4% 2.8% 
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07. Public Order Count 21 20 23 12 18 94 
% within cohort 22.6% 24.4% 31.9% 22.6% 19.8% 24.0% 
08. Racial Problems Count 0 1 0 0 1 2 
% within cohort .0% 1.2% .0% .0% 1.1% .5% 
09. Social Welfare Count 46 35 29 27 40 177 
% within cohort 49.5% 42.7% 40.3% 50.9% 44.0% 45.3% 
Total Count 93 82 72 53 91 391 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 3 Strength of Presidential Vote Choice  
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Strength- Presidential Vote 
Prefere 
1. Strong Count 142     142 
% within cohort 80.2%     80.2% 
5. Not strong Count 35     35 
% within cohort 19.8%     19.8% 
Total Count 177     177 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Strength- Presidential Vote 
Prefere 
1. Strong Count 64 82    146 
% within cohort 71.9% 74.5%    73.4% 
5. Not strong Count 25 28    53 
% within cohort 28.1% 25.5%    26.6% 
Total Count 89 110    199 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
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1992 Strength- Presidential Vote 
Prefere 
1. Strong Count 148 118 134   400 
% within cohort 78.7% 81.4% 82.2%   80.6% 
5. Not strong Count 40 27 29   96 
% within cohort 21.3% 18.6% 17.8%   19.4% 
Total Count 188 145 163   496 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Strength- Presidential Vote 
Prefere 
1. Strong Count 86 61 50 56  253 
% within cohort 69.4% 65.6% 71.4% 81.2%  71.1% 
5. Not strong Count 38 32 20 13  103 
% within cohort 30.6% 34.4% 28.6% 18.8%  28.9% 
Total Count 124 93 70 69  356 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Strength- Presidential Vote 
Prefere 
1. Strong Count 73 83 65 49 70 340 
% within cohort 66.4% 75.5% 81.3% 79.0% 81.4% 75.9% 
5. Not strong Count 37 27 15 13 16 108 
% within cohort 33.6% 24.5% 18.8% 21.0% 18.6% 24.1% 
Total Count 110 110 80 62 86 448 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Strength- Presidential Vote 
Prefere 
1. Strong Count  47  78 53 178 
% within cohort  85.5%  75.0% 91.4% 82.0% 
5. Not strong Count  8  26 5 39 
% within cohort  14.5%  25.0% 8.6% 18.0% 
Total Count  55  104 58 217 






Table 4 Strength of Partisanship 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Strength of R Partisanship 1. Independent or Apolitical Count 70     70 
% within cohort 18.1%     18.1% 
2. Leaning Independent Count 117     117 
% within cohort 30.3%     30.3% 
3. Weak Partisan Count 133     133 
% within cohort 34.5%     34.5% 
4. Strong Partisan Count 66     66 
% within cohort 17.1%     17.1% 
Total Count 386     386 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Strength of R Partisanship 1. Independent or Apolitical Count 23 52    75 
% within cohort 11.7% 18.1%    15.5% 
2. Leaning Independent Count 64 84    148 
% within cohort 32.7% 29.2%    30.6% 
3. Weak Partisan Count 56 91    147 
% within cohort 28.6% 31.6%    30.4% 
4. Strong Partisan Count 53 61    114 
% within cohort 27.0% 21.2%    23.6% 
Total Count 196 288    484 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 Strength of R Partisanship 1. Independent or Apolitical Count 35 37 62   134 
% within cohort 12.9% 15.7% 19.7%   16.3% 
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2. Leaning Independent Count 78 75 103   256 
% within cohort 28.8% 31.8% 32.7%   31.1% 
3. Weak Partisan Count 100 78 100   278 
% within cohort 36.9% 33.1% 31.7%   33.8% 
4. Strong Partisan Count 58 46 50   154 
% within cohort 21.4% 19.5% 15.9%   18.7% 
Total Count 271 236 315   822 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Strength of R Partisanship 1. Independent or Apolitical Count 19 14 14 19  66 
% within cohort 10.0% 9.0% 11.9% 11.0%  10.4% 
2. Leaning Independent Count 48 38 37 58  181 
% within cohort 25.3% 24.4% 31.4% 33.5%  28.4% 
3. Weak Partisan Count 66 63 37 60  226 
% within cohort 34.7% 40.4% 31.4% 34.7%  35.5% 
4. Strong Partisan Count 57 41 30 36  164 
% within cohort 30.0% 26.3% 25.4% 20.8%  25.7% 
Total Count 190 156 118 173  637 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Strength of R Partisanship 1. Independent or Apolitical Count 25 15 26 18 42 126 
% within cohort 14.0% 8.6% 18.8% 15.9% 21.0% 15.7% 
2. Leaning Independent Count 46 52 40 42 72 252 
% within cohort 25.8% 29.9% 29.0% 37.2% 36.0% 31.4% 
3. Weak Partisan Count 52 53 38 25 53 221 
% within cohort 29.2% 30.5% 27.5% 22.1% 26.5% 27.5% 
4. Strong Partisan Count 55 54 34 28 33 204 
% within cohort 30.9% 31.0% 24.6% 24.8% 16.5% 25.4% 
Total Count 178 174 138 113 200 803 
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% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Strength of R Partisanship 1. Independent or Apolitical Count  12  10 9 31 
% within cohort  13.5%  6.6% 10.5% 9.5% 
2. Leaning Independent Count  29  47 22 98 
% within cohort  32.6%  30.9% 25.6% 30.0% 
3. Weak Partisan Count  20  58 25 103 
% within cohort  22.5%  38.2% 29.1% 31.5% 
4. Strong Partisan Count  28  37 30 95 
% within cohort  31.5%  24.3% 34.9% 29.1% 
Total Count  89  152 86 327 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 5 Self- Described Ideology 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
1. Liberal Count 112     112 
% within cohort 29.1%     29.1% 
3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
Count 101     101 
% within cohort 26.2%     26.2% 
5. Conservative Count 141     141 
% within cohort 36.6%     36.6% 
6 Count 31     31 
% within cohort 8.1%     8.1% 
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Total Count 385     385 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
1. Liberal Count 65 108    173 
% within cohort 33.2% 37.8%    35.9% 
3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
Count 13 22    35 
% within cohort 6.6% 7.7%    7.3% 
5. Conservative Count 98 123    221 
% within cohort 50.0% 43.0%    45.9% 
6 Count 20 33    53 
% within cohort 10.2% 11.5%    11.0% 
Total Count 196 286    482 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
1. Liberal Count 98 89 136   323 
% within cohort 36.2% 37.6% 43.3%   39.3% 
3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
Count 15 17 13   45 
% within cohort 5.5% 7.2% 4.1%   5.5% 
5. Conservative Count 143 117 138   398 
% within cohort 52.8% 49.4% 43.9%   48.4% 
6 Count 15 14 27   56 
% within cohort 5.5% 5.9% 8.6%   6.8% 
Total Count 271 237 314   822 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
1. Liberal Count 64 55 51 78  248 
% within cohort 33.7% 34.8% 43.2% 45.1%  38.8% 
3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
Count 20 18 9 14  61 
% within cohort 10.5% 11.4% 7.6% 8.1%  9.5% 
5. Conservative Count 103 78 56 73  310 
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% within cohort 54.2% 49.4% 47.5% 42.2%  48.5% 
6 Count 3 7 2 8  20 
% within cohort 1.6% 4.4% 1.7% 4.6%  3.1% 
Total Count 190 158 118 173  639 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
1. Liberal Count 24 25 22 20 42 133 
% within cohort 27.6% 29.4% 30.6% 37.7% 46.7% 34.4% 
3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
Count 2 2 2 7 10 23 
% within cohort 2.3% 2.4% 2.8% 13.2% 11.1% 5.9% 
5. Conservative Count 59 55 41 24 27 206 
% within cohort 67.8% 64.7% 56.9% 45.3% 30.0% 53.2% 
6 Count 2 3 7 2 11 25 
% within cohort 2.3% 3.5% 9.7% 3.8% 12.2% 6.5% 
Total Count 87 85 72 53 90 387 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
1. Liberal Count  23  49 36 108 
% within cohort  30.7%  35.5% 48.6% 37.6% 
3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
Count  3  6 4 13 
% within cohort  4.0%  4.3% 5.4% 4.5% 
5. Conservative Count  47  77 31 155 
% within cohort  62.7%  55.8% 41.9% 54.0% 
7. Refuses to choose (in 
follow-up [exc. 1988 
moderates]) 
Count  2  4 3 9 
% within cohort  2.7%  2.9% 4.1% 3.1% 
8 Count  0  2 0 2 
% within cohort  .0%  1.4% .0% .7% 
Total Count  75  138 74 287 
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% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 6 Opinions on When Abortion Should be Legal 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 43     43 
% within cohort 11.4%     11.4% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 111     111 
% within cohort 29.4%     29.4% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 80     80 
% within cohort 21.2%     21.2% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 143     143 
% within cohort 37.9%     37.9% 
Total Count 377     377 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 18 38    56 
% within cohort 9.2% 13.3%    11.7% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 54 90    144 
% within cohort 27.7% 31.6%    30.0% 
3. The law should permit Count 36 47    83 
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abortion for reasons other 
than 
% within cohort 18.5% 16.5% 
   
17.3% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 87 110    197 
% within cohort 44.6% 38.6%    41.0% 
Total Count 195 285    480 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 22 12 31   65 
% within cohort 8.4% 5.2% 9.9%   8.1% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 74 72 88   234 
% within cohort 28.2% 31.0% 28.2%   29.0% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 38 31 34   103 
% within cohort 14.5% 13.4% 10.9%   12.8% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 128 117 159   404 
% within cohort 48.9% 50.4% 51.0%   50.1% 
Total Count 262 232 312   806 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 21 19 9 20  69 
% within cohort 11.2% 12.4% 7.7% 11.6%  11.0% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 48 32 29 50  159 
% within cohort 25.7% 20.9% 24.8% 29.1%  25.3% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 22 27 20 33  102 
% within cohort 11.8% 17.6% 17.1% 19.2%  16.2% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 96 75 59 69  299 
% within cohort 51.3% 49.0% 50.4% 40.1%  47.5% 
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Total Count 187 153 117 172  629 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 18 28 8 9 23 86 
% within cohort 10.5% 16.6% 5.8% 8.3% 11.6% 11.0% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 39 36 46 35 73 229 
% within cohort 22.8% 21.3% 33.3% 32.4% 36.7% 29.2% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 26 24 17 20 21 108 
% within cohort 15.2% 14.2% 12.3% 18.5% 10.6% 13.8% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 88 81 67 44 82 362 
% within cohort 51.5% 47.9% 48.6% 40.7% 41.2% 46.1% 
Total Count 171 169 138 108 199 785 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count  9  17 10 36 
% within cohort  12.0%  12.4% 14.1% 12.7% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count  21  35 16 72 
% within cohort  28.0%  25.5% 22.5% 25.4% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count  12  26 10 48 
% within cohort  16.0%  19.0% 14.1% 17.0% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count  33  59 35 127 
% within cohort  44.0%  43.1% 49.3% 44.9% 
Total Count  75  137 71 283 




Table 7Opinions on When Abortion Should be Legal with Education Controlled For 
 
R Position Lib-Cons 3-
category Summ 
year cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1. Liberal 1984.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 5     5 
% within cohort 4.5%     4.5% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 27     27 
% within cohort 24.5%     24.5% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 25     25 
% within cohort 22.7%     22.7% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 53     53 
% within cohort 48.2%     48.2% 
Total Count 110     110 
% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 5 14    19 
% within cohort 7.8% 13.2
% 
   
11.2% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 14 23    37 
% within cohort 21.9% 21.7
% 
   
21.8% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 7 20    27 
% within cohort 10.9% 18.9
% 




4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 38 49    87 
% within cohort 59.4% 46.2
% 
   
51.2% 
Total Count 64 106    170 




   
100.0
% 
1992.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 4 3 5   12 





2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 16 19 30   65 





3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 14 11 12   37 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 62 54 88   204 





Total Count 96 87 135   318 









1996.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 2 4 1 6  13 





2. The law should permit Count 4 2 7 15  28 
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abortion only in case of 
rape, 






3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 8 12 7 16  43 






4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 49 36 36 41  162 






Total Count 63 54 51 78  246 











2000.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 1 2 0 0 3 6 
% within cohort 4.3% 8.3
% 
.0% .0% 7.1% 4.6% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 0 2 6 4 13 25 







3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 5 3 1 6 6 21 







4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 17 17 15 10 20 79 







Total Count 23 24 22 20 42 131 














2004.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count  0  2 1 3 
% within cohort  .0%  4.1% 2.9% 2.8% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count  5  11 7 23 










3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count  2  6 4 12 










4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count  16  30 23 69 










Total Count  23  49 35 107 











3. Moderate ('middle of the 
road') 
1984.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 3     3 
% within cohort 3.0%     3.0% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 27     27 
% within cohort 27.3%     27.3% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 29     29 
% within cohort 29.3%     29.3% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 40     40 
% within cohort 40.4%     40.4% 
Total Count 99     99 
% within cohort 100.0
% 





1988.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 0 3    3 
% within cohort .0% 14.3
% 
   
8.8% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 2 6    8 
% within cohort 15.4% 28.6
% 
   
23.5% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 4 4    8 
% within cohort 30.8% 19.0
% 
   
23.5% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 7 8    15 
% within cohort 53.8% 38.1
% 
   
44.1% 
Total Count 13 21    34 




   
100.0
% 
1992.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 2 0 1   3 
% within cohort 14.3% .0% 8.3%   7.1% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 3 7 5   15 





3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 0 1 1   2 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 9 8 5   22 





Total Count 14 16 12   42 
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1996.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 2 2 1 2  7 






2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 6 6 2 6  20 






3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 1 2 2 1  6 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 11 6 4 5  26 






Total Count 20 16 9 14  59 











2000.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 0 1 0 0 0 1 
% within cohort .0% 50.0
% 
.0% .0% .0% 4.8% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 0 0 0 1 7 8 





3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 1 0 0 0 1 2 
% within cohort 100.0
% 
.0% .0% .0% 10.0
% 
9.5% 
4. By law, a woman should Count 0 1 2 5 2 10 
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Total Count 1 2 2 6 10 21 












2004.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count  0  1 1 2 









2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count  2  2 2 6 










3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count  0  2 0 2 







4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count  1  1 0 2 








Total Count  3  6 3 12 











5. Conservative 1984.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 29     29 
% within cohort 21.6%     21.6% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 44     44 
% within cohort 32.8%     32.8% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 22     22 
% within cohort 16.4%     16.4% 
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4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 39     39 
% within cohort 29.1%     29.1% 
Total Count 134     134 
% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 11 13    24 
% within cohort 11.2% 10.6
% 
   
10.9% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 30 49    79 
% within cohort 30.6% 39.8
% 
   
35.7% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 23 18    41 
% within cohort 23.5% 14.6
% 
   
18.6% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 34 43    77 
% within cohort 34.7% 35.0
% 
   
34.8% 
Total Count 98 123    221 




   
100.0
% 
1992.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 14 7 18   39 





2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 50 39 44   133 





3. The law should permit Count 22 17 18   57 
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abortion for reasons other 
than 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 53 52 56   161 





Total Count 139 115 136   390 









1996.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 17 11 7 8  43 






2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 37 23 19 26  105 






3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 13 11 11 16  51 






4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 34 31 18 22  105 






Total Count 101 76 55 72  304 











2000.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 6 10 2 1 3 22 





2. The law should permit Count 22 12 15 11 10 70 
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abortion only in case of 
rape, 







3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 7 9 6 4 4 30 







4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 21 22 18 5 10 76 







Total Count 56 53 41 21 27 198 












2004.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count  9  12 6 27 










2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count  13  20 7 40 










3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count  10  18 5 33 










4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count  15  26 12 53 










Total Count  47  76 30 153 











6 1984.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 5     5 
% within cohort 16.1%     16.1% 
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2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 12     12 
% within cohort 38.7%     38.7% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 4     4 
% within cohort 12.9%     12.9% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 10     10 
% within cohort 32.3%     32.3% 
Total Count 31     31 
% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 2 7    9 
% within cohort 10.5% 21.9
% 
   
17.6% 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 7 11    18 
% within cohort 36.8% 34.4
% 
   
35.3% 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 2 5    7 
% within cohort 10.5% 15.6
% 
   
13.7% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 8 9    17 
% within cohort 42.1% 28.1
% 
   
33.3% 
Total Count 19 32    51 




   
100.0
% 
1992.00 When Should Abortion Be 1. By law, abortion should Count 2 2 7   11 
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2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 5 6 8   19 





3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 2 2 3   7 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 3 3 9   15 





Total Count 12 13 27   52 









1996.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 0 2 0 4  6 






2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 1 1 1 3  6 






3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 0 2 0 0  2 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 2 2 1 1  6 






Total Count 3 7 2 8  20 
 
84 











2000.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count 1 2 1 1 1 6 





2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count 0 0 3 1 3 7 





3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count 0 0 1 0 1 2 
% within cohort .0% .0% 14.3% .0% 9.1% 8.0% 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count 1 1 2 0 6 10 





Total Count 2 3 7 2 11 25 












7. Refuses to choose (in 
follow-up [exc. 1988 
moderates]) 
2004.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
1. By law, abortion should 
never be permitted 
Count  0  2 2 4 









2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count  1  1 0 2 








3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other 
than 
Count  0  0 1 1 







4. By law, a woman should Count  1  1 0 2 
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Total Count  2  4 3 9 











8 2004.00 When Should Abortion Be 
Allowed by 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of 
rape, 
Count    1  1 
% within cohort 





4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
Count    1  1 
% within cohort 





Total Count    2  2 
% within cohort 








Table 8 Opinion on Affirmative Action 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1992 Affirmative Action Hiring and 
Promo 
1. For Count 50 43 67   160 
% within cohort 19.9% 20.2% 23.3%   21.3% 
5. Against Count 196 166 208   570 
% within cohort 78.1% 77.9% 72.5%   75.9% 
8. DK;1990- Count 5 4 12   21 
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1994:refused;1996 and later: 
other 
% within cohort 2.0% 1.9% 4.2% 
  
2.8% 
Total Count 251 213 287   751 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Affirmative Action Hiring and 
Promo 
1. For Count 23 20 15 24  82 
% within cohort 13.5% 14.6% 14.3% 18.6%  15.2% 
5. Against Count 138 107 85 95  425 
% within cohort 81.2% 78.1% 81.0% 73.6%  78.6% 
8. DK;1990-
1994:refused;1996 and later: 
other 
Count 9 10 5 10  34 
% within cohort 5.3% 7.3% 4.8% 7.8%  6.3% 
Total Count 170 137 105 129  541 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Affirmative Action Hiring and 
Promo 
1. For Count 21 18 18 11 55 123 
% within cohort 11.8% 10.5% 12.9% 10.0% 27.8% 15.4% 
5. Against Count 144 137 108 92 130 611 
% within cohort 80.9% 79.7% 77.7% 83.6% 65.7% 76.7% 
8. DK;1990-
1994:refused;1996 and later: 
other 
Count 13 17 13 7 13 63 
% within cohort 7.3% 9.9% 9.4% 6.4% 6.6% 7.9% 
Total Count 178 172 139 110 198 797 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Affirmative Action Hiring and 
Promo 
1. For Count  13  20 24 57 
% within cohort  17.6%  14.5% 32.4% 19.9% 
5. Against Count  57  107 48 212 
% within cohort  77.0%  77.5% 64.9% 74.1% 
8. DK;1990- Count  4  11 2 17 
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1994:refused;1996 and later: 
other 




8.0% 2.7% 5.9% 
Total Count  74  138 74 286 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 9 Opinions on Homosexuals Serving in the Military 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1992 R Favor/Oppose Gays in 
Military 
1. Yes, think so Count 153 124 161   438 
% within cohort 61.2% 59.9% 56.1%   58.9% 
5. Don't think so Count 90 74 114   278 
% within cohort 36.0% 35.7% 39.7%   37.4% 
8. DK Count 7 9 12   28 
% within cohort 2.8% 4.3% 4.2%   3.8% 
Total Count 250 207 287   744 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 R Favor/Oppose Gays in 
Military 
1. Yes, think so Count 120 93 84 92  389 
% within cohort 70.2% 67.4% 79.2% 70.8%  71.4% 
5. Don't think so Count 47 42 22 38  149 
% within cohort 27.5% 30.4% 20.8% 29.2%  27.3% 
8. DK Count 4 3 0 0  7 
% within cohort 2.3% 2.2% .0% .0%  1.3% 
Total Count 171 138 106 130  545 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
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2000 R Favor/Oppose Gays in 
Military 
1. Yes, think so Count 132 130 96 83 171 612 
% within cohort 73.7% 75.6% 69.6% 73.5% 85.9% 76.4% 
5. Don't think so Count 41 35 36 27 22 161 
% within cohort 22.9% 20.3% 26.1% 23.9% 11.1% 20.1% 
8. DK Count 6 7 6 3 6 28 
% within cohort 3.4% 4.1% 4.3% 2.7% 3.0% 3.5% 
Total Count 179 172 138 113 199 801 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 R Favor/Oppose Gays in 
Military 
1. Yes, think so Count  59  117 62 238 
% within cohort  79.7%  86.7% 83.8% 84.1% 
5. Don't think so Count  13  16 10 39 
% within cohort  17.6%  11.9% 13.5% 13.8% 
8. DK Count  2  2 2 6 
% within cohort  2.7%  1.5% 2.7% 2.1% 
Total Count  74  135 74 283 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 10 Opinion on Federal Welfare Spending 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1992 Welfare Programs - Federal 
Spending 
1. Increased Count 49 45 69   163 
% within cohort 18.0% 19.0% 21.8%   19.8% 
2. Same Count 89 80 128   297 
% within cohort 32.7% 33.8% 40.5%   36.0% 
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3. Decreased or cut out 
entirely 
Count 127 107 113   347 
% within cohort 46.7% 45.1% 35.8%   42.1% 
8. DK Count 7 5 6   18 
% within cohort 2.6% 2.1% 1.9%   2.2% 
Total Count 272 237 316   825 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Welfare Programs - Federal 
Spending 
1. Increased Count 17 19 15 32  83 
% within cohort 8.9% 12.0% 12.8% 18.5%  13.0% 
2. Same Count 59 37 33 59  188 
% within cohort 31.1% 23.4% 28.2% 34.1%  29.5% 
3. Decreased or cut out 
entirely 
Count 113 101 69 81  364 
% within cohort 59.5% 63.9% 59.0% 46.8%  57.1% 
8. DK Count 1 1 0 1  3 
% within cohort .5% .6% .0% .6%  .5% 
Total Count 190 158 117 173  638 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Welfare Programs - Federal 
Spending 
1. Increased Count 29 31 27 18 45 150 
% within cohort 16.2% 17.8% 19.4% 15.9% 22.5% 18.6% 
2. Same Count 77 70 47 48 81 323 
% within cohort 43.0% 40.2% 33.8% 42.5% 40.5% 40.1% 
3. Decreased or cut out 
entirely 
Count 71 72 65 45 72 325 
% within cohort 39.7% 41.4% 46.8% 39.8% 36.0% 40.4% 
8. DK Count 2 1 0 2 2 7 
% within cohort 1.1% .6% .0% 1.8% 1.0% .9% 
Total Count 179 174 139 113 200 805 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Welfare Programs - Federal 1. Increased Count  22  33 25 80 
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Spending % within cohort  25.0%  21.2% 29.1% 24.2% 
2. Same Count  35  70 36 141 
% within cohort  39.8%  44.9% 41.9% 42.7% 
3. Decreased or cut out 
entirely 
Count  31  53 25 109 
% within cohort  35.2%  34.0% 29.1% 33.0% 
Total Count  88  156 86 330 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 11 Opinions on Federal Spending on Food Stamps 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Food Stamps Spending -
Federal Spend 
1. Increased Count 84     84 
% within cohort 25.2%     25.2% 
2. Same Count 119     119 
% within cohort 35.7%     35.7% 
3. Decreased Count 122     122 
% within cohort 36.6%     36.6% 
8. DK Count 8     8 
% within cohort 2.4%     2.4% 
Total Count 333     333 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Food Stamps Spending -
Federal Spend 
1. Increased Count 47 71    118 
% within cohort 23.9% 24.7%    24.3% 
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2. Same Count 83 131    214 
% within cohort 42.1% 45.5%    44.1% 
3. Decreased Count 61 81    142 
% within cohort 31.0% 28.1%    29.3% 
8. DK Count 6 5    11 
% within cohort 3.0% 1.7%    2.3% 
Total Count 197 288    485 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 Food Stamps Spending -
Federal Spend 
1. Increased Count 48 35 62   145 
% within cohort 17.6% 14.8% 19.6%   17.6% 
2. Same Count 124 121 164   409 
% within cohort 45.6% 51.1% 51.9%   49.6% 
3. Decreased Count 93 74 85   252 
% within cohort 34.2% 31.2% 26.9%   30.5% 
8. DK Count 7 7 5   19 
% within cohort 2.6% 3.0% 1.6%   2.3% 
Total Count 272 237 316   825 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Food Stamps Spending -
Federal Spend 
1. Increased Count 21 21 10 21  73 
% within cohort 11.1% 13.3% 8.5% 12.1%  11.4% 
2. Same Count 76 57 46 77  256 
% within cohort 40.0% 36.1% 39.3% 44.5%  40.1% 
3. Decreased Count 93 78 60 74  305 
% within cohort 48.9% 49.4% 51.3% 42.8%  47.8% 
8. DK Count 0 2 1 1  4 
% within cohort .0% 1.3% .9% .6%  .6% 
Total Count 190 158 117 173  638 
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% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Food Stamps Spending -
Federal Spend 
1. Increased Count 28 21 32 20 32 133 
% within cohort 15.6% 12.1% 23.0% 17.9% 16.0% 16.5% 
2. Same Count 96 88 57 49 103 393 
% within cohort 53.3% 50.6% 41.0% 43.8% 51.5% 48.8% 
3. Decreased Count 50 58 47 41 61 257 
% within cohort 27.8% 33.3% 33.8% 36.6% 30.5% 31.9% 
7. Cut out entirely 
(volunteered) 
Count 0 3 1 0 1 5 
% within cohort .0% 1.7% .7% .0% .5% .6% 
8. DK Count 6 4 2 2 3 17 
% within cohort 3.3% 2.3% 1.4% 1.8% 1.5% 2.1% 
Total Count 180 174 139 112 200 805 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 12 Did Respondents Vote 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Did R Register and Vote 1. Not registered, and did 
not vote 
Count 109     109 
% within cohort 32.1%     32.1% 
2. Registered, but did not 
vote 
Count 48     48 
% within cohort 14.1%     14.1% 
3. Voted (registered) Count 183     183 
% within cohort 53.8%     53.8% 
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Total Count 340     340 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Did R Register and Vote 1. Not registered, and did 
not vote 
Count 44 98    142 
% within cohort 27.2% 41.0%    35.4% 
2. Registered, but did not 
vote 
Count 27 30    57 
% within cohort 16.7% 12.6%    14.2% 
3. Voted (registered) Count 91 111    202 
% within cohort 56.2% 46.4%    50.4% 
Total Count 162 239    401 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 Did R Register and Vote 1. Not registered, and did 
not vote 
Count 42 56 97   195 
% within cohort 16.7% 26.2% 33.8%   25.9% 
2. Registered, but did not 
vote 
Count 21 12 26   59 
% within cohort 8.3% 5.6% 9.1%   7.8% 
3. Voted (registered) Count 189 146 164   499 
% within cohort 75.0% 68.2% 57.1%   66.3% 
Total Count 252 214 287   753 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Did R Register and Vote 1. Not registered, and did 
not vote 
Count 20 24 15 26  85 
% within cohort 11.6% 17.3% 14.2% 19.8%  15.5% 
2. Registered, but did not 
vote 
Count 27 17 20 33  97 
% within cohort 15.7% 12.2% 18.9% 25.2%  17.7% 
3. Voted (registered) Count 125 98 71 72  366 
% within cohort 72.7% 70.5% 67.0% 55.0%  66.8% 
Total Count 172 139 106 131  548 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Did R Register and Vote 1. Not registered, and did Count 17 22 20 18 43 120 
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not vote % within cohort 11.5% 15.0% 17.7% 19.4% 26.9% 18.2% 
2. Registered, but did not 
vote 
Count 21 13 12 13 29 88 
% within cohort 14.2% 8.8% 10.6% 14.0% 18.1% 13.3% 
3. Voted (registered) Count 110 112 81 62 88 453 
% within cohort 74.3% 76.2% 71.7% 66.7% 55.0% 68.5% 
Total Count 148 147 113 93 160 661 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Did R Register and Vote 1. Not registered, and did 
not vote 
Count  9  16 6 31 
% within cohort  12.0%  11.6% 8.1% 10.8% 
2. Registered, but did not 
vote 
Count  11  16 10 37 
% within cohort  14.7%  11.6% 13.5% 12.9% 
3. Voted (registered) Count  55  106 58 219 
% within cohort  73.3%  76.8% 78.4% 76.3% 
Total Count  75  138 74 287 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 13 Political Knowledge of Respondents  
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 17     17 
% within cohort 4.4%     4.4% 
2. Fairly High Count 76     76 
% within cohort 19.5%     19.5% 
3. Average Count 146     146 
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% within cohort 37.5%     37.5% 
4. Fairly Low Count 107     107 
% within cohort 27.5%     27.5% 
5. Very Low Count 43     43 
% within cohort 11.1%     11.1% 
Total Count 389     389 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 14 17    31 
% within cohort 7.2% 5.9%    6.4% 
2. Fairly High Count 42 55    97 
% within cohort 21.5% 19.1%    20.1% 
3. Average Count 70 86    156 
% within cohort 35.9% 29.9%    32.3% 
4. Fairly Low Count 41 84    125 
% within cohort 21.0% 29.2%    25.9% 
5. Very Low Count 28 46    74 
% within cohort 14.4% 16.0%    15.3% 
Total Count 195 288    483 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 43 24 21   88 
% within cohort 15.9% 10.1% 6.6%   10.7% 
2. Fairly High Count 83 68 77   228 
% within cohort 30.6% 28.6% 24.4%   27.6% 
3. Average Count 94 98 127   319 
% within cohort 34.7% 41.2% 40.2%   38.7% 
4. Fairly Low Count 40 35 71   146 
% within cohort 14.8% 14.7% 22.5%   17.7% 
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5. Very Low Count 11 13 20   44 
% within cohort 4.1% 5.5% 6.3%   5.3% 
Total Count 271 238 316   825 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 20 18 13 7  58 
% within cohort 10.9% 11.8% 11.2% 4.2%  9.4% 
2. Fairly High Count 53 36 31 35  155 
% within cohort 29.0% 23.5% 26.7% 20.8%  25.0% 
3. Average Count 71 51 47 67  236 
% within cohort 38.8% 33.3% 40.5% 39.9%  38.1% 
4. Fairly Low Count 32 36 17 45  130 
% within cohort 17.5% 23.5% 14.7% 26.8%  21.0% 
5. Very Low Count 7 12 8 14  41 
% within cohort 3.8% 7.8% 6.9% 8.3%  6.6% 
Total Count 183 153 116 168  620 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 25 29 24 18 16 112 
% within cohort 14.0% 16.8% 17.4% 15.9% 8.0% 13.9% 
2. Fairly High Count 43 46 39 22 31 181 
% within cohort 24.0% 26.6% 28.3% 19.5% 15.5% 22.5% 
3. Average Count 67 61 40 38 64 270 
% within cohort 37.4% 35.3% 29.0% 33.6% 32.0% 33.6% 
4. Fairly Low Count 35 25 28 30 62 180 
% within cohort 19.6% 14.5% 20.3% 26.5% 31.0% 22.4% 
5. Very Low Count 9 12 7 5 27 60 
% within cohort 5.0% 6.9% 5.1% 4.4% 13.5% 7.5% 
Total Count 179 173 138 113 200 803 
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% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count  17  30 13 60 
% within cohort  19.1%  19.7% 16.0% 18.6% 
2. Fairly High Count  20  46 23 89 
% within cohort  22.5%  30.3% 28.4% 27.6% 
3. Average Count  32  48 30 110 
% within cohort  36.0%  31.6% 37.0% 34.2% 
4. Fairly Low Count  13  21 12 46 
% within cohort  14.6%  13.8% 14.8% 14.3% 
5. Very Low Count  7  7 3 17 
% within cohort  7.9%  4.6% 3.7% 5.3% 
Total Count  89  152 81 322 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 14 Political Knowledge of Respondents with Education Acting as a Control 
 
R Education 4-category Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1. Grade school or less (0-8 
grades) 
1984 Pre - R Level of Political Info 4. Fairly Low Count 5     5 
% within cohort 62.5
% 
    
62.5
% 
5. Very Low Count 3     3 
% within cohort 37.5
% 
    
37.5
% 
Total Count 8     8 
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% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 Pre - R Level of Political Info 3. Average Count 1 0    1 
% within cohort 33.3
% 
.0% 
   
16.7
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 2 1    3 




   
50.0
% 
5. Very Low Count 0 2    2 
% within cohort .0% 66.7
% 
   
33.3
% 
Total Count 3 3    6 




   
100.0
% 
1992 Pre - R Level of Political Info 3. Average Count 0 0 2   2 





4. Fairly Low Count 2 2 1   5 









5. Very Low Count 0 1 0   1 






Total Count 2 3 3   8 











1996 Pre - R Level of Political Info 3. Average Count 0 1    1 
% within cohort .0% 50.0
% 
   
33.3
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 1 1    2 




   
66.7
% 
Total Count 1 2    3 




   
100.0
% 
2000 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 0 0 1   1 





3. Average Count 0 1 1   2 







4. Fairly Low Count 1 0 0   1 






5. Very Low Count 1 2 0   3 








Total Count 2 3 2   7 









2004 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count  1  0  1 
 
100 









3. Average Count  1  0  1 









5. Very Low Count  0  2  2 









Total Count  2  2  4 










2. High school (12 grades or 
fewer, incl. non-college 
1984 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 1     1 
% within cohort .5%     .5% 
2. Fairly High Count 25     25 
% within cohort 11.7
% 
    
11.7
% 
3. Average Count 83     83 
% within cohort 39.0
% 
    
39.0
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 71     71 
% within cohort 33.3
% 
    
33.3
% 
5. Very Low Count 33     33 
% within cohort 15.5
% 
    
15.5
% 
Total Count 213     213 
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% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 3 2    5 
% within cohort 2.9% 1.2%    1.8% 
2. Fairly High Count 16 16    32 
% within cohort 15.2
% 
9.4% 
   
11.6
% 
3. Average Count 36 51    87 




   
31.5
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 28 63    91 




   
33.0
% 
5. Very Low Count 22 39    61 




   
22.1
% 
Total Count 105 171    276 




   
100.0
% 
1992 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 7 3 6   16 




2. Fairly High Count 24 19 29   72 









3. Average Count 47 46 60   153 











4. Fairly Low Count 23 26 54   103 









5. Very Low Count 10 10 19   39 





Total Count 111 104 168   383 









1996 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 2 3 0 0  5 
% within cohort 3.1% 4.5% .0% .0%  2.1% 
2. Fairly High Count 10 5 2 8  25 









3. Average Count 24 25 19 21  89 











4. Fairly Low Count 21 24 10 28  83 











5. Very Low Count 7 10 4 13  34 











Total Count 64 67 35 70  236 











2000 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 6 0 6 1 7 20 
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3.1% 8.1% 7.4% 
2. Fairly High Count 4 12 7 2 6 31 






3. Average Count 22 21 13 5 16 77 










4. Fairly Low Count 19 17 13 19 42 110 










5. Very Low Count 5 6 3 5 15 34 








Total Count 56 56 42 32 86 272 












2004 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count  2  6 1 9 








2. Fairly High Count  7  7 3 17 









3. Average Count  11  14 8 33 









4. Fairly Low Count  7  9 6 22 
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5. Very Low Count  2  4 2 8 







Total Count  29  40 20 89 











3. Some college(13 grades 
or more, but no degree;1984 
1984 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 10     10 
% within cohort 8.0%     8.0% 
2. Fairly High Count 32     32 
% within cohort 25.6
% 
    
25.6
% 
3. Average Count 48     48 
% within cohort 38.4
% 
    
38.4
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 28     28 
% within cohort 22.4
% 
    
22.4
% 
5. Very Low Count 7     7 
% within cohort 5.6%     5.6% 
Total Count 125     125 
% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 3 5    8 
% within cohort 7.0% 6.3%    6.6% 
2. Fairly High Count 6 27    33 
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27.0
% 
3. Average Count 20 24    44 




   
36.1
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 10 18    28 




   
23.0
% 
5. Very Low Count 4 5    9 
% within cohort 9.3% 6.3%    7.4% 
Total Count 43 79    122 




   
100.0
% 
1992 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 13 4 9   26 







2. Fairly High Count 35 29 30   94 









3. Average Count 28 30 49   107 









4. Fairly Low Count 9 4 14   27 







5. Very Low Count 0 2 1   3 






Total Count 85 69 103   257 









1996 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 5 2 2 3  12 





2. Fairly High Count 15 21 8 16  60 











3. Average Count 33 16 17 38  104 











4. Fairly Low Count 9 6 5 13  33 











5. Very Low Count 0 1 2 0  3 





Total Count 62 46 34 70  212 











2000 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 5 9 3 2 3 22 




5.9% 3.8% 8.2% 
2. Fairly High Count 15 15 13 6 14 63 










3. Average Count 28 26 10 19 32 115 
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4. Fairly Low Count 11 4 10 7 18 50 








5. Very Low Count 1 4 3 0 11 19 
% within cohort 1.7% 6.9% 7.7
% 
.0% 14.1% 7.1% 
Total Count 60 58 39 34 78 269 












2004 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count  3  8 3 14 









2. Fairly High Count  3  15 10 28 









3. Average Count  11  20 13 44 









4. Fairly Low Count  4  9 4 17 









5. Very Low Count  5  1 1 7 





1.9% 3.2% 6.4% 
Total Count  26  53 31 110 
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4. College or advanced 
degree (no cases 1948) 
1984 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 6     6 
% within cohort 14.0
% 
    
14.0
% 
2. Fairly High Count 19     19 
% within cohort 44.2
% 
    
44.2
% 
3. Average Count 15     15 
% within cohort 34.9
% 
    
34.9
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 3     3 
% within cohort 7.0%     7.0% 
Total Count 43     43 
% within cohort 100.0
% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 7 10    17 




   
25.0
% 
2. Fairly High Count 20 10    30 




   
44.1
% 
3. Average Count 9 8    17 




   
25.0
% 
4. Fairly Low Count 1 1    2 
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% within cohort 2.6% 3.4%    2.9% 
5. Very Low Count 2 0    2 
% within cohort 5.1% .0%    2.9% 
Total Count 39 29    68 




   
100.0
% 
1992 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 22 16 6   44 









2. Fairly High Count 23 19 16   58 









3. Average Count 16 21 12   49 









4. Fairly Low Count 3 2 2   7 




Total Count 64 58 36   158 









1996 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 13 13 11 4  41 











2. Fairly High Count 28 10 21 11  70 
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3. Average Count 14 9 11 8  42 











4. Fairly Low Count 1 5 2 4  12 








5. Very Low Count 0 1 2 1  4 





Total Count 56 38 47 28  169 











2000 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count 14 20 14 15 6 69 










2. Fairly High Count 24 19 19 14 11 87 










3. Average Count 17 13 16 13 16 75 










4. Fairly Low Count 4 4 5 4 2 19 
% within cohort 6.6% 7.1% 9.1
% 
8.7% 5.6% 7.5% 
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5. Very Low Count 2 0 1 0 1 4 
% within cohort 3.3% .0% 1.8
% 
.0% 2.8% 1.6% 
Total Count 61 56 55 46 36 254 












2004 Pre - R Level of Political Info 1. Very High Count  11  16 9 36 









2. Fairly High Count  10  24 10 44 









3. Average Count  9  14 9 32 









4. Fairly Low Count  2  3 2 7 
% within cohort  6.3%  5.3% 6.7% 5.9% 
Total Count  32  57 30 119 













Table 15 Interest in Public Affairs 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
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1984 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 63     63 
% within cohort 19.0%     19.0% 
2. Only now and then Count 101     101 
% within cohort 30.5%     30.5% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 110     110 
% within cohort 33.2%     33.2% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 57     57 
% within cohort 17.2%     17.2% 
Total Count 331     331 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 34 55    89 
% within cohort 21.5% 23.3%    22.6% 
2. Only now and then Count 47 73    120 
% within cohort 29.7% 30.9%    30.5% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 53 75    128 
% within cohort 33.5% 31.8%    32.5% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 24 32    56 
% within cohort 15.2% 13.6%    14.2% 
9. DK Count 0 1    1 
% within cohort .0% .4%    .3% 
Total Count 158 236    394 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 24 28 45   97 
% within cohort 9.6% 13.1% 15.7%   12.9% 
2. Only now and then Count 58 58 80   196 
% within cohort 23.2% 27.1% 27.9%   26.1% 
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3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 116 91 121   328 
% within cohort 46.4% 42.5% 42.2%   43.7% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 50 37 40   127 
% within cohort 20.0% 17.3% 13.9%   16.9% 
9. DK Count 2 0 1   3 
% within cohort .8% .0% .3%   .4% 
Total Count 250 214 287   751 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 26 27 18 25  96 
% within cohort 15.1% 19.4% 16.8% 19.1%  17.5% 
2. Only now and then Count 47 50 34 45  176 
% within cohort 27.3% 36.0% 31.8% 34.4%  32.1% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 71 38 39 43  191 
% within cohort 41.3% 27.3% 36.4% 32.8%  34.8% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 28 24 16 18  86 
% within cohort 16.3% 17.3% 15.0% 13.7%  15.7% 
Total Count 172 139 107 131  549 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 24 16 19 17 41 117 
% within cohort 16.3% 10.8% 17.0% 17.9% 25.8% 17.7% 
2. Only now and then Count 36 53 37 31 67 224 
% within cohort 24.5% 35.8% 33.0% 32.6% 42.1% 33.9% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 61 50 40 33 39 223 
% within cohort 41.5% 33.8% 35.7% 34.7% 24.5% 33.7% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 26 29 16 14 12 97 
% within cohort 17.7% 19.6% 14.3% 14.7% 7.5% 14.7% 
Total Count 147 148 112 95 159 661 
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% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count  8  13 7 28 
% within cohort  10.7%  9.4% 9.5% 9.8% 
2. Only now and then Count  19  46 24 89 
% within cohort  25.3%  33.3% 32.4% 31.0% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count  28  55 25 108 
% within cohort  37.3%  39.9% 33.8% 37.6% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count  20  23 18 61 
% within cohort  26.7%  16.7% 24.3% 21.3% 
9. DK Count  0  1 0 1 
% within cohort  .0%  .7% .0% .3% 
Total Count  75  138 74 287 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 16 Interest in Public Affairs with Education Acting as a Control 
 
R Education 4-category Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1. Grade school or less (0-8 
grades) 
1984 R Interest Public Affairs 2. Only now and then Count 3     3 
% within cohort 75.0
% 
    
75.0% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 1     1 
% within cohort 25.0
% 
    
25.0% 
Total Count 4     4 
 
115 
% within cohort 100.
0% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 1 3    4 




   
80.0% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 1 0    1 
% within cohort 50.0
% 
.0% 
   
20.0% 
Total Count 2 3    5 




   
100.0
% 
1992 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 1 2 2   5 








2. Only now and then Count 0 1 0   1 





3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 0 0 1   1 




Total Count 1 3 3   7 









1996 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 1 1    2 








2. Only now and then Count 0 1    1 
% within cohort .0% 50.0
% 
   
33.3% 
Total Count 1 2    3 




   
100.0
% 
2000 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 2 1 0   3 







3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 0 0 1   1 




Total Count 2 1 1   4 









2004 R Interest Public Affairs 2. Only now and then Count  1  1  2 









3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count  1  0  1 








Total Count  2  1  3 










2. High school (12 grades or 
fewer, incl. non-college 
1984 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 53     53 
% within cohort 28.6
% 




2. Only now and then Count 52     52 
% within cohort 28.1
% 
    
28.1% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 61     61 
% within cohort 33.0
% 
    
33.0% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 19     19 
% within cohort 10.3
% 
    
10.3% 
Total Count 185     185 
% within cohort 100.
0% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 24 39    63 




   
28.8% 
2. Only now and then Count 28 45    73 




   
33.3% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 22 42    64 




   
29.2% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 6 12    18 
% within cohort 7.5% 8.6%    8.2% 
9. DK Count 0 1    1 
% within cohort .0% .7%    .5% 
Total Count 80 139    219 
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100.0
% 
1992 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 16 20 34   70 








2. Only now and then Count 31 33 43   107 








3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 41 34 59   134 








4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 9 5 17   31 




9. DK Count 2 0 1   3 
% within cohort 2.0% .0% .6%   .9% 
Total Count 99 92 154   345 









1996 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 12 17 6 15  50 










2. Only now and then Count 11 20 14 14  59 










3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 28 14 11 12  65 












4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 8 8 1 5  22 










Total Count 59 59 32 46  196 











2000 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 13 11 8 5 23 60 











2. Only now and then Count 16 21 15 10 26 88 











3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 16 9 8 5 16 54 











4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 4 4 2 4 4 18 







Total Count 49 45 33 24 69 220 












2004 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count  4  8 4 16 










2. Only now and then Count  5  14 7 26 










3. Some of the time Count  8  9 5 22 
 
120 










4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count  8  3 2 13 








9. DK Count  0  1 0 1 
% within cohort  .0%  2.9% .0% 1.3% 
Total Count  25  35 18 78 











3. Some college(13 grades 
or more, but no 
degree;1984 
1984 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 9     9 
% within cohort 8.5%     8.5% 
2. Only now and then Count 39     39 
% within cohort 36.8
% 
    
36.8% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 36     36 
% within cohort 34.0
% 
    
34.0% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 22     22 
% within cohort 20.8
% 
    
20.8% 
Total Count 106     106 
% within cohort 100.
0% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 8 12    20 








2. Only now and then Count 10 19    29 




   
28.4% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 14 25    39 




   
38.2% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 5 9    14 




   
13.7% 
Total Count 37 65    102 




   
100.0
% 
1992 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 2 4 8   14 




2. Only now and then Count 16 15 27   58 








3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 36 33 46   115 








4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 25 11 12   48 








Total Count 79 63 93   235 









1996 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: Count 10 5 7 7  29 
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2. Only now and then Count 20 17 9 24  70 










3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 23 12 12 26  73 










4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 7 8 3 3  21 









Total Count 60 42 31 60  193 











2000 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 5 3 5 8 13 34 









2. Only now and then Count 14 19 13 10 29 85 











3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 21 18 12 10 15 76 











4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 8 11 2 1 3 25 









Total Count 48 51 32 29 60 220 
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2004 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count  4  3 3 10 








2. Only now and then Count  4  20 10 34 










3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count  9  20 10 39 










4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count  3  5 8 16 










Total Count  20  48 31 99 











4. College or advanced 
degree (no cases 1948) 
1984 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 1     1 
% within cohort 2.8%     2.8% 
2. Only now and then Count 7     7 
% within cohort 19.4
% 
    
19.4% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 13     13 
% within cohort 36.1
% 
    
36.1% 
4. Most of the time Count 15     15 
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(1960,1962: very closely) % within cohort 41.7
% 
    
41.7% 
Total Count 36     36 
% within cohort 100.
0% 
    
100.0
% 
1988 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 1 0    1 
% within cohort 2.9% .0%    1.7% 
2. Only now and then Count 8 6    14 




   
23.3% 
3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 14 8    22 




   
36.7% 
4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 12 11    23 




   
38.3% 
Total Count 35 25    60 




   
100.0
% 
1992 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 4 0 1   5 




2. Only now and then Count 10 9 7   26 








3. Some of the time Count 34 24 15   73 
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4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 15 20 9   44 








Total Count 63 53 32   148 









1996 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 3 4 5 3  15 








2. Only now and then Count 16 12 11 7  46 










3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 20 12 16 5  53 










4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 13 8 12 10  43 










Total Count 52 36 44 25  157 











2000 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count 4 1 6 3 5 19 







2. Only now and then Count 6 13 9 11 12 51 











3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count 24 23 19 18 8 92 











4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count 14 14 12 9 5 54 











Total Count 48 51 46 41 30 216 












2004 R Interest Public Affairs 1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: 
not much at all) 
Count  0  2 0 2 
% within cohort  .0%  3.7% .0% 1.9% 
2. Only now and then Count  9  11 7 27 










3. Some of the time 
(1960,1962: fairly closely) 
Count  10  26 10 46 










4. Most of the time 
(1960,1962: very closely) 
Count  9  15 8 32 










Total Count  28  54 25 107 














Table 17 Opinions on the World Standing of the United States 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 





Count 67     67 
% within cohort 17.3%     17.3% 
3. Same Count 172     172 
% within cohort 44.4%     44.4% 
5. Stronger Count 137     137 
% within cohort 35.4%     35.4% 
8. DK Count 11     11 
% within cohort 2.8%     2.8% 
Total Count 387     387 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 





Count 70 95    165 
% within cohort 35.5% 32.9%    34.0% 
3. Same Count 73 109    182 
% within cohort 37.1% 37.7%    37.4% 
5. Stronger Count 47 80    127 
% within cohort 23.9% 27.7%    26.1% 
8. DK Count 7 5    12 
% within cohort 3.6% 1.7%    2.5% 
Total Count 197 289    486 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
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Count 74 73 105   252 
% within cohort 27.4% 30.7% 33.2%   30.6% 
3. Same Count 98 91 112   301 
% within cohort 36.3% 38.2% 35.4%   36.5% 
5. Stronger Count 95 70 93   258 
% within cohort 35.2% 29.4% 29.4%   31.3% 
8. DK Count 3 4 6   13 
% within cohort 1.1% 1.7% 1.9%   1.6% 
Total Count 270 238 316   824 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 





Count 48 43 37 42  170 
% within cohort 25.3% 27.2% 31.4% 24.3%  26.6% 
3. Same Count 98 74 50 80  302 
% within cohort 51.6% 46.8% 42.4% 46.2%  47.3% 
5. Stronger Count 42 40 30 47  159 
% within cohort 22.1% 25.3% 25.4% 27.2%  24.9% 
8. DK Count 2 1 1 4  8 
% within cohort 1.1% .6% .8% 2.3%  1.3% 
Total Count 190 158 118 173  639 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 





Count 59 55 41 28 32 215 
% within cohort 32.8% 31.6% 29.5% 24.8% 16.1% 26.7% 
3. Same Count 82 79 80 60 96 397 
% within cohort 45.6% 45.4% 57.6% 53.1% 48.2% 49.3% 
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5. Stronger Count 37 38 17 23 67 182 
% within cohort 20.6% 21.8% 12.2% 20.4% 33.7% 22.6% 
8. DK Count 2 2 1 2 4 11 
% within cohort 1.1% 1.1% .7% 1.8% 2.0% 1.4% 
Total Count 180 174 139 113 199 805 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 





Count  34  72 52 158 
% within cohort  38.6%  45.9% 61.2% 47.9% 
3. Same Count  32  47 21 100 
% within cohort  36.4%  29.9% 24.7% 30.3% 
5. Stronger Count  22  36 12 70 
% within cohort  25.0%  22.9% 14.1% 21.2% 
8. DK Count  0  2 0 2 
% within cohort  .0%  1.3% .0% .6% 
Total Count  88  157 85 330 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 18 Data on Newspaper Readership 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 How Often R Read 
Newspaper in Last 
0. None Count 120     120 
% within cohort 30.8%     30.8% 
1. One day Count 62     62 
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% within cohort 15.9%     15.9% 
2 Count 41     41 
% within cohort 10.5%     10.5% 
3 Count 38     38 
% within cohort 9.8%     9.8% 
4 Count 30     30 
% within cohort 7.7%     7.7% 
5 Count 21     21 
% within cohort 5.4%     5.4% 
6 Count 10     10 
% within cohort 2.6%     2.6% 
7. Every day Count 67     67 
% within cohort 17.2%     17.2% 
Total Count 389     389 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 How Often R Read 
Newspaper in Last 
0. None Count 44 92    136 
% within cohort 22.4% 31.8%    28.0% 
1. One day Count 28 42    70 
% within cohort 14.3% 14.5%    14.4% 
2 Count 25 29    54 
% within cohort 12.8% 10.0%    11.1% 
3 Count 19 22    41 
% within cohort 9.7% 7.6%    8.5% 
4 Count 6 20    26 
% within cohort 3.1% 6.9%    5.4% 
5 Count 12 11    23 
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% within cohort 6.1% 3.8%    4.7% 
6 Count 4 5    9 
% within cohort 2.0% 1.7%    1.9% 
7. Every day Count 58 68    126 
% within cohort 29.6% 23.5%    26.0% 
Total Count 196 289    485 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 How Often R Read 
Newspaper in Last 
0. None Count 66 63 101   230 
% within cohort 26.0% 29.3% 35.8%   30.6% 
1. One day Count 39 35 49   123 
% within cohort 15.4% 16.3% 17.4%   16.4% 
2 Count 33 19 32   84 
% within cohort 13.0% 8.8% 11.3%   11.2% 
3 Count 17 25 28   70 
% within cohort 6.7% 11.6% 9.9%   9.3% 
4 Count 14 20 12   46 
% within cohort 5.5% 9.3% 4.3%   6.1% 
5 Count 9 12 9   30 
% within cohort 3.5% 5.6% 3.2%   4.0% 
6 Count 5 2 3   10 
% within cohort 2.0% .9% 1.1%   1.3% 
7. Every day Count 71 39 48   158 
% within cohort 28.0% 18.1% 17.0%   21.0% 
Total Count 254 215 282   751 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 How Often R Read 
Newspaper in Last 
0. None Count 46 44 41 52  183 
% within cohort 24.2% 27.8% 34.7% 30.1%  28.6% 
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1. One day Count 36 34 20 33  123 
% within cohort 18.9% 21.5% 16.9% 19.1%  19.2% 
2 Count 24 18 14 25  81 
% within cohort 12.6% 11.4% 11.9% 14.5%  12.7% 
3 Count 10 14 13 17  54 
% within cohort 5.3% 8.9% 11.0% 9.8%  8.5% 
4 Count 18 11 9 12  50 
% within cohort 9.5% 7.0% 7.6% 6.9%  7.8% 
5 Count 8 11 4 9  32 
% within cohort 4.2% 7.0% 3.4% 5.2%  5.0% 
6 Count 5 1 6 3  15 
% within cohort 2.6% .6% 5.1% 1.7%  2.3% 
7. Every day Count 43 25 11 22  101 
% within cohort 22.6% 15.8% 9.3% 12.7%  15.8% 
Total Count 190 158 118 173  639 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 How Often R Read 
Newspaper in Last 
0. None Count 55 57 42 41 67 262 
% within cohort 30.6% 32.8% 30.2% 36.3% 33.5% 32.5% 
1. One day Count 18 26 22 15 34 115 
% within cohort 10.0% 14.9% 15.8% 13.3% 17.0% 14.3% 
2 Count 20 14 24 18 26 102 
% within cohort 11.1% 8.0% 17.3% 15.9% 13.0% 12.7% 
3 Count 24 12 12 10 18 76 
% within cohort 13.3% 6.9% 8.6% 8.8% 9.0% 9.4% 
4 Count 8 3 6 7 12 36 
% within cohort 4.4% 1.7% 4.3% 6.2% 6.0% 4.5% 
5 Count 12 13 7 6 11 49 
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% within cohort 6.7% 7.5% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 6.1% 
6 Count 1 3 2 1 2 9 
% within cohort .6% 1.7% 1.4% .9% 1.0% 1.1% 
7. Every day Count 42 46 24 15 30 157 
% within cohort 23.3% 26.4% 17.3% 13.3% 15.0% 19.5% 
Total Count 180 174 139 113 200 806 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 How Often R Read 
Newspaper in Last 
0. None Count  26  60 34 120 
% within cohort  29.2%  38.2% 39.5% 36.1% 
1. One day Count  10  25 16 51 
% within cohort  11.2%  15.9% 18.6% 15.4% 
2 Count  8  23 9 40 
% within cohort  9.0%  14.6% 10.5% 12.0% 
3 Count  5  10 9 24 
% within cohort  5.6%  6.4% 10.5% 7.2% 
4 Count  7  11 6 24 
% within cohort  7.9%  7.0% 7.0% 7.2% 
5 Count  11  8 4 23 
% within cohort  12.4%  5.1% 4.7% 6.9% 
6 Count  4  1 0 5 
% within cohort  4.5%  .6% .0% 1.5% 
7. Every day Count  18  19 8 45 
% within cohort  20.2%  12.1% 9.3% 13.6% 
Total Count  89  157 86 332 




Table 19 Data on How Often the Cohorts Watch the National News 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1984 How Many Days R Watched 
National TV 
0. None Count 78     78 
% within cohort 20.1%     20.1% 
1. One day Count 65     65 
% within cohort 16.8%     16.8% 
2 Count 63     63 
% within cohort 16.2%     16.2% 
3 Count 66     66 
% within cohort 17.0%     17.0% 
4 Count 33     33 
% within cohort 8.5%     8.5% 
5 Count 21     21 
% within cohort 5.4%     5.4% 
6 Count 14     14 
% within cohort 3.6%     3.6% 
7. Every day Count 48     48 
% within cohort 12.4%     12.4% 
Total Count 388     388 
% within cohort 100.0%     100.0% 
1988 How Many Days R Watched 
National TV 
0. None Count 22 45    67 
% within cohort 11.2% 15.6%    13.8% 
1. One day Count 16 10    26 
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% within cohort 8.1% 3.5%    5.4% 
2 Count 27 31    58 
% within cohort 13.7% 10.8%    12.0% 
3 Count 20 33    53 
% within cohort 10.2% 11.5%    10.9% 
4 Count 15 20    35 
% within cohort 7.6% 6.9%    7.2% 
5 Count 20 14    34 
% within cohort 10.2% 4.9%    7.0% 
6 Count 3 8    11 
% within cohort 1.5% 2.8%    2.3% 
7. Every day Count 74 127    201 
% within cohort 37.6% 44.1%    41.4% 
Total Count 197 288    485 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0%    100.0% 
1992 How Many Days R Watched 
National TV 
0. None Count 33 30 42   105 
% within cohort 13.0% 14.0% 14.8%   14.0% 
1. One day Count 19 14 24   57 
% within cohort 7.5% 6.5% 8.5%   7.6% 
2 Count 26 27 47   100 
% within cohort 10.3% 12.6% 16.6%   13.3% 
3 Count 34 29 36   99 
% within cohort 13.4% 13.5% 12.7%   13.2% 
4 Count 22 27 27   76 
% within cohort 8.7% 12.6% 9.5%   10.1% 
5 Count 27 14 28   69 
% within cohort 10.7% 6.5% 9.9%   9.2% 
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6 Count 2 5 2   9 
% within cohort .8% 2.3% .7%   1.2% 
7. Every day Count 90 69 77   236 
% within cohort 35.6% 32.1% 27.2%   31.4% 
Total Count 253 215 283   751 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   100.0% 
1996 How Many Days R Watched 
National TV 
0. None Count 42 49 28 53  172 
% within cohort 22.1% 31.2% 23.7% 30.6%  27.0% 
1. One day Count 25 19 21 28  93 
% within cohort 13.2% 12.1% 17.8% 16.2%  14.6% 
2 Count 32 27 15 39  113 
% within cohort 16.8% 17.2% 12.7% 22.5%  17.7% 
3 Count 26 16 18 22  82 
% within cohort 13.7% 10.2% 15.3% 12.7%  12.9% 
4 Count 18 6 11 4  39 
% within cohort 9.5% 3.8% 9.3% 2.3%  6.1% 
5 Count 18 8 11 10  47 
% within cohort 9.5% 5.1% 9.3% 5.8%  7.4% 
6 Count 5 4 0 1  10 
% within cohort 2.6% 2.5% .0% .6%  1.6% 
7. Every day Count 24 28 14 16  82 
% within cohort 12.6% 17.8% 11.9% 9.2%  12.9% 
Total Count 190 157 118 173  638 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 How Many Days R Watched 
National TV 
0. None Count 64 52 48 41 83 288 
% within cohort 35.6% 29.9% 34.5% 36.3% 41.9% 35.8% 
1. One day Count 22 21 15 15 28 101 
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% within cohort 12.2% 12.1% 10.8% 13.3% 14.1% 12.6% 
2 Count 21 25 26 17 27 116 
% within cohort 11.7% 14.4% 18.7% 15.0% 13.6% 14.4% 
3 Count 18 19 20 11 16 84 
% within cohort 10.0% 10.9% 14.4% 9.7% 8.1% 10.4% 
4 Count 12 9 2 8 9 40 
% within cohort 6.7% 5.2% 1.4% 7.1% 4.5% 5.0% 
5 Count 13 13 5 6 12 49 
% within cohort 7.2% 7.5% 3.6% 5.3% 6.1% 6.1% 
6 Count 1 2 3 2 1 9 
% within cohort .6% 1.1% 2.2% 1.8% .5% 1.1% 
7. Every day Count 29 33 20 13 22 117 
% within cohort 16.1% 19.0% 14.4% 11.5% 11.1% 14.6% 
Total Count 180 174 139 113 198 804 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 How Many Days R Watched 
National TV 
0. None Count  17  45 22 84 
% within cohort  19.1%  28.7% 25.6% 25.3% 
1. One day Count  6  14 14 34 
% within cohort  6.7%  8.9% 16.3% 10.2% 
2 Count  15  14 14 43 
% within cohort  16.9%  8.9% 16.3% 13.0% 
3 Count  11  22 10 43 
% within cohort  12.4%  14.0% 11.6% 13.0% 
4 Count  5  17 4 26 
% within cohort  5.6%  10.8% 4.7% 7.8% 
5 Count  9  15 8 32 
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% within cohort  10.1%  9.6% 9.3% 9.6% 
6 Count  1  3 2 6 
% within cohort  1.1%  1.9% 2.3% 1.8% 
7. Every day Count  25  27 12 64 
% within cohort  28.1%  17.2% 14.0% 19.3% 
Total Count  89  157 86 332 
% within cohort  100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 20 Data on Who got Election Information from the Internet 
 
Year of Study cohort 
Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
1996 R Get Election Info from 
Internet 
1. Yes Count 18 12 13 22  65 
% within cohort 32.7% 27.3% 31.7% 31.9%  31.1% 
5. No Count 37 32 28 47  144 
% within cohort 67.3% 72.7% 68.3% 68.1%  68.9% 
Total Count 55 44 41 69  209 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 
2000 R Get Election Info from 
Internet 
1. Yes Count 56 59 45 37 66 263 
% within cohort 51.9% 54.6% 56.3% 53.6% 53.2% 53.8% 
5. No Count 52 49 35 32 58 226 
% within cohort 48.1% 45.4% 43.8% 46.4% 46.8% 46.2% 
Total Count 108 108 80 69 124 489 
% within cohort 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2004 R Get Election Info from 1. Yes Count  45  86 42 173 
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Internet % within cohort  75.0%  71.7% 72.4% 72.7% 
5. No Count  15  34 16 65 
% within cohort  25.0%  28.3% 27.6% 27.3% 
Total Count  60  120 58 238 


















Figure 6 Cohort Syntax Used in this Study 
RECODE VCF0101 (18 thru 26=1) (22 thru 30=2) (26 thru 34=3) (30 thru 38=4) (34 thru 42=5) 
INTO  
    age_group. 
EXECUTE. 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1984 & age_group=1) cohort=1. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1988 & age_group=2) cohort=1. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1992 & age_group=3) cohort=1. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=4) cohort=1. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=5) cohort=1. 
EXECUTE. 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1988 & age_group=1) cohort=2. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1992 & age_group=2) cohort=2. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=3) cohort=2. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=4) cohort=2. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=5) cohort=2. 
EXECUTE. 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1992 & age_group=1) cohort=3. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 




DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=3) cohort=3. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=4) cohort=3. 
EXECUTE. 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=1) cohort=4. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=2) cohort=4. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=3) cohort=4. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=4) cohort=4. 
EXECUTE. 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=1) cohort=5. 
EXECUTE. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
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